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Limiting Losses Attributable to 
Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense of 
the Traditional System Against 
the At-Risk Concept 
Glenn E. Covent 
The proper treatment of transactions involving debt remains one of 
the most perplexing issues in the federal income tax system. The sepa-
rate-transaction system-in which the loan and the use of the loan pro-
ceeds are viewed as distinct transactions-that has nominally governed 
since the Supreme Court's decision in Crane v. Commissioner 1 has never 
secured universal acceptance. When that system did not appear to pro-
duce the desired result, the courts, the Commissioner, and the Congress 
have reverted to the pre-Crane single-transaction system of treating the 
loan and the use of the loan proceeds as aspects of a single transaction. 
The inherent conflict between these two systems has produced complex-
ity and uncertainty in the taxation of debt-financed property 
transactions. 
Much of this vacillation has stemmed from legal arrangements that 
might excuse a borrower or constructive borrower from repaying the 
entire amonnt of a loan. Under the separate-transaction approach, a bor-
rower who uses loan proceeds to purchase property can include those 
proceeds in the calculation of his basis.2 The borrower thus has the abil-
ity to claim losses and deductions for the entire amount of the indebted-
ness. If the loan is without recourse, however, the borrower might not 
bear an economic burden equivalent to the deductions claimed. This 
possibility made the separate-transaction approach appear to allow some 
taxpayers to take undeserved deductions. Accordingly, when the loan 
does not entail personal liability, there has been a tendency to replace the 
separate-transaction analysis with one or another manifestation of what 
is referred to herein as the "at-risk" concept. 3 Thus, whether the courts 
apply a single-transaction analysis to a borrowing,4 the Treasury Depart-
t Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. B.A. 1963, Swarthmore College; LL.B. 
1966, Columbia University. 
1. 331 u.s. 1 (1947). 
2. See, e.g., id. at 11 (value of nonrecourse loan included in basis). 
3. See infra note 10 and accompanying text. 
4. See cases cited infra note 23. 
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ment denies a basis adjustment to a limited partner, 5 or Congress enacts 
legislation prohibiting certain deductions, 6 the effect is the same: the 
purchaser of property is denied basis to the extent of his financing. 
The concurrent use of two systems has also caused severe problems 
in administering the tax laws. In particular, the provisions controlling 
the tax consequences for partnerships involved in debt-financed transac-
tions have never been satisfactory. Recent litigation has demonstrated 
that the basis provisions are unworkable, 7 and Congress has directed the 
Treasury Department to revise those rules promptly. 8 Those revisions, 
in turn, will likely require a significant modification of the proposed regu-
lations providing for the allocation of income and expense among part-
ners.9 Before the Treasury Department makes any revisions, however, it 
should recognize that the source of the difficulties resides in the at-risk 
concept, 10 and it should inquire whether the perceived benefits of the at- . 
risk analysis justify the cost in confusion and complexity. 
This Article argues that the resulting cost is not warranted, and that 
the at-risk concept in any of its manifestations is wrong in principle. The 
Article also demonstrates that applying the traditional separate-transac-
tion system to any bona fide transaction involving loans and loan pro-
ceeds will yield a correct income tax result. Since the greatest deviation 
from this system has occurred in the treatment of transactions involving 
5. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960). 
6. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 465 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
7. See, e.g., Raphan v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl 457 (1983), rev'd in part, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985). 
8. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 79(b), 98 Stat. 4494, 4597 (1984). 
9. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-1(b) (1985). Like the regulations under§ 752 for limited partners, 
the newly enacted regulations under § 704 import at-risk concepts. In general, the regulations deny 
Joss allocations to partners who are not required to restore deficits in their capital accounts, and in 
certain cases the rules allocate these losses to other partners. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b). 
The § 704 regulations as recently enacted do not deal specifically with the treatment of 
nonrecourse debt. However, the proposed regulations did contain a discussion of this topic and 
applied a special rule to allocating losses attributable to recourse and nonrecourse borrowing. See ld. 
§ 1.704-1(b)(4)(iv) (proposed March 9, 1983). This section was reserved when the other subsections 
of the regulation were adopted. See T.D. 8065, 1986-5 I.R.B. 4, 19. 
This Article does not attempt to explore the changes that should be made in the § 704 
regulations. However, if the distinctions drawn under the § 752 regulations and the at-risk concept 
are both discarded as suggested here, the § 704 regulations would require revision to delete reliance 
on similar notions. 
10. The heart of the at-risk concept is embodied in § 465. The at-risk rule of this section bars 
many taxpayers from deducting losses attributable to an activity which are in excess of the 
taxpayer's basis attributable to an equity investment and amounts borrowed for which the taxpayer 
is personally liable. Thus, deductions attributable to a nonrecourse borrowing might not be 
deductible as incurred. Losses in excess of the at-risk amount must be carried forward, and may be 
applied against subsequent profits or increases in the at-risk amount attributable to new investment. 
The origin of § 465 is described infra at text accompanying notes 133-40. While intended only 
as a limitation on tax-shelter losses, the section, as written, acts as a modification of the general basis 
rules and occasionally is so viewed. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 309 n.7 (1983). 
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conduit entities, this Article initially addresses the treatment of limited 
partners and of J!Onrecourse borrowing by partnerships. 11 
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the failures of the present 
law governing partnership taxation arise directly from the fact that the 
regulations under subchapter K 12 inadequately implement the Crane 
doctrine and the separate-transaction system of analysis. The proper 
revision of the basis allocation rules, therefore, must adapt that system 
more faithfully. Part II develops the form that the partnership rules 
would assume if they were fashioned in conformity with the principles of 
the Crane system. This section also shows that the resulting system 
would be simpler and far more rational than current law. 
The deviations from the separate-transaction system in the partner-
ship basis and at-risk rules reflect the belief that the traditional rules 
inadequately tax persons claiming losses not accompanied by an eco-
nomic detriment. That belief, however, is erroneous. Part III demon-
strates that the traditional approach to cancellation-of-indebtedness 
income, with minor modifications, produces an appropriate tax liability 
and that the at-risk limitations are technically unnecessary. By incorpo-
rating a minor but important revision to the taxation of cancellation-of-
indebtedness income, the simplified rules would eliminate the potential 
for taxpayer abuse as effectively as the complex restrictions now in effect. 
Part IV then discusses nontheoretical justifications for the at-risk rules 
and notes that while the rules may help combat fraud, they are overly 
broad and must be revised in order to provide taxpayers with the proper 
tax consequences of bona fide transactions. 
I 
THE EXISTING SYSTEM AND ITS DEFICIENCIES 
A. The Statutory Pattern 
The taxation of partnerships is based on a blend of the entity and 
aggregate conceptions of a partnership. 13 In the taxation of ongoing 
partnership activities, the aggregate or conduit approach predominates: 
11. Although this Article addresses the taxation of partnerships, the conclusions reached 
herein with respect to limited partners could equally apply to the taxation of shareholders in 
corporations electing to be taxed under subchapter S, I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
The taxation of S corporations now largely conforms to the taxation of partnerships. However, S 
corporation shareholders, like limited partners and in part for the same reasons, are not entitled to a 
basis adjustment attributable to an entity-level borrowing. See I.R.C. § 1367(a) (1982 & Supp. II 
1984) (describing when basis in shareholder's stock may be increased). 
12. I.R.C. §§ 701-761 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
13. For a general discussion of partnership taxation, see 1 & 2 W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. 
WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS (1978). For a discussion of 
the entity and aggregate concepts, see 1 id. § 1.02. 
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partnerships are not taxable entities, 14 and partners are taxed directly on 
their allocable share of partnership income and expenses. 15 Nevertheless, 
a partnership is an entity in which the several partners have invested. 
For measuring gain or loss on that investment, either upon a sale of a 
partnership interest16 or upon a distribution from the partnership, 17 each 
partner has a tax basis for his partnership interest. 18 
When a partnership borrows money to purchase property, the part-
nership's tax basis in that property includes the proceeds of the borrow-
ing.19 If the property is depreciable or otherwise generates a tax loss, the 
partnership measures those losses against that basis. These losses are 
then allocated to the partners who can deduct the losses from their indi-
vidual taxable incomes. However, since taxpayers may not recognize 
losses in excess of their investment, 20 partners may not claim losses with 
respect to partnership activities in excess of their tax basis for their inter-
ests in the partnership.21 
Obviously, the effect of the partnership's loan and subsequent 
purchase of property on each partner's basis will determine how much of 
the expenses and losses each partner can deduct. An aggregate approach 
to the taxation of partnership borrowing would treat the partnership as a 
mere conduit. The transaction would be reconstructed for tax purposes 
as if the partners borrowed the money as individuals, contributed the 
14. I.R.C. § 701 (1982). 
15. /d. § 702(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
16. Id. § 741 (1982). 
17. The taxation of partnership distributions consists of a relatively complicated blend of 
aggregate and entity concepts. In general, however, gain is recognized only on the distribution of 
cash in excess of a partner's adjusted basis for his partnership interest. /d. § 731(a)(1) (1982). On the 
other hand, property distributions are nonrecognition transactions in which the partnership basis for 
the distributed property carries over to the distributee partner. /d. § 732 (1982). 
18. /d. §§ 722 (Supp. II 1984), 742 (1982). In general, a partner's basis for a purchased 
partnership interest is equal to the amount paid; thus, basis acquired by a contribution to the 
partnership equals the sum of the cash and the adjusted basis of property transferred to the 
partnership. The partner's basis is thereafter increased by profits allocated to the partner and 
reduced by losses and distributions to the partner. /d. § 705 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
19. Apparently, the Commissioner has historically permitted taxpayers to increase the basis of 
acquired property by the amount of any indebtedness issued to the seller or the amount of any 
indebtedness that encumbered the property at the time it was acquired. See Greenbaum, The Basis 
of Property Shall Be the Cost of Such Property: How Is Cost Defined?, 3 TAX L. REV. 351, 356 
(1948). In Crane, 331 U.S. at 11, the Supreme Court held that this treatment of indebtedness was 
applicable to both recourse and nonrecourse loans, as long as the property's value equalled or 
exceeded the total indebtedness. This separate-transaction approach to indebtedness, regardless of 
the character of the debt, has become associated with the Crane decision. 
20. For dispositions of property, see I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1982) (amount of loss for income tax 
purposes equals excess of basis over amount realized on disposition). See also id. § 165(b) (1982) 
(basis for determining deduction for any loss not compensated by insurance is same as basis for 
determining loss on sale or other disposition of property). 
21. /d. § 704(d) (1982). Excess losses, however, may be carried forward and claimed when 
sufficient basis becomes available. 
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proceeds to the partnership, and then used the proceeds to acquire part-
nership assets. Thus, the partners in the aggregate would be treated as 
having made an investment in the partnership equal to the amount bor-
rowed. That investment would increase the partners' basis for their part-
nership interests and would permit partners to claim losses attributable 
to the expenditure of the loan proceeds as incurred. 
On the other hand, under an entity approach a partnership's loans 
would have no effect upon the partners. While the partnership would 
acquire a basis for any property purchased with the proceeds, each part-
ner's basis for his individual partnership interest would not change. 
Each partner's basis would increase by any profits the partnership earned 
and attributed to the partners, some of which presumably would be used 
to retire the indebtedness, but the basis would not be increased by the 
partnership's borrowing. As a result, partners could not deduct partner-
ship losses in excess of their actual cash investment plus profits accumu-
lated in prior years. If the partnership actually incurred economic losses, 
a partner might not be able to claim his share until the disposition of his 
partnership interest. 22 
The distinction between the aggregate and entity approaches paral-
lels the early debate about whether a borrowing and subsequent purchase 
constitute separate transactions or a single taxable event. Proponents of 
the separate-transaction approach viewed the purchaser as borrowing 
cash and using that cash to acquire property. As a result, the taxpayer 
acquired a basis in the property and could claim depreciation and other 
deductions in the same manner and to the same extent as someone 
acquiring property with his own funds. Proponents of the single-transac-
tion approach, however, viewed the debt as an obligation to pay the 
purchase price for the property. The taxpayer's basis was therefore lim-
ited to the actual cash paid for the property and increased by payments 
in discharge of the loan. 23 In developing the consequences of transaction 
22. Tax losses, of course, are not always accompanied by economic losses. Several provisions 
of the Code deliberately permit the claiming of tax losses in advance of economic losses for the 
purpose of stimulating investment. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 46 (1982 & Supp. II 1984) (investment tax 
credit); id. § 168 (West Supp. 1986) (accelerated cost recovery); id. § 613 (1982) (percentage 
depletion). The deferral of tax losses until an economic loss occurs has the effect of completely 
eliminating the investment incentive feature of these allowances. 
The entity approach is also currently applied to S corporations. As a result, shareholders of S 
corporations must plan their transactions carefully or risk losing the benefit of accelerated income 
tax deductions. See Coven & Hess, The Subchapter S Revision Act: An Analysis and Appraisal, 50 
TENN. L. REv. 569, 599-604 (1983). 
23. There are, of course, other implications. Suppose, for example, the taxpayer benefitted 
from the cancellation of the debt. Under the separate-transaction analysis the taxpayer is taxed 
immediately on the amount forgiven. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931). 
Under the single-transaction approach, however, the cancellation simply represents a failure to pay 
the full purchase price for the property and has no tax consequences. The taxpayer thus merely 
obtains a basis in the property equal to the amount of the note actually discharged. See, e.g., Hotel 
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involving debt-financed property, the courts and the Commissioner dif-
fered over whether to approach the borrowing and the purchase as sepa-
rate and independently taxable events or as steps in a single transaction.24 
In Crane v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court adopted the separate-
transaction approach for most debt-financed property. Mrs. Crane had 
inherited property that was subject to a nonrecourse debt presumably 
equal to the unencumbered value of the property. She eventually sold 
the property, still subject to the debt, and reported the sale using a single-
transaction analysis. Under that approach, her basis would have been 
limited to the net value of the property when inherited, or zero, and the 
amount realized upon the disposition would have been limited to the 
$3,000 cash actually received. The Supreme Court, however, sustained 
the Commissioner's contention that the separate-transaction analysis the 
Court had previously extended to property encumbered with recourse 
debt25 should be applied to Mrs. Crane's property sale. The Court con-
cluded that the financial consequences of recourse and nonrecourse debt 
were too similar to justify the application of two radically different pat-
terns of taxation. Accordingly, the taxpayer's basis for the property was 
the unencumbered value of the property when inherited, as reduced by 
allowable depreciation, and the amount realized on the sale included the 
amount of the debt that burdened the property. 
When Congress revised the partnership taxation rules seven years 
later, it adapted the Crane approach to the computation of a partner's 
tax basis for his partnership interest. Thus, a partnership-level borrow-
ing is treated as if the partners had borrowed cash and had contributed 
that cash to the partnership.26 Conversely, the partnership's repayment 
of the loan is treated as if the partnership had distributed cash to the 
partners and the partners had discharged the liability to the lender.27 As 
Astoria, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 759, 764 (1940); Fulton Gold Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 
B.T.A. 519, 521 (1934). 
After the Crane decision a hybrid approach emerged. Basis was computed under a separate-
transaction approach, but either the single-transaction or a blend of the separate- and single-
transaction approaches was applied to the cancellation of debts. See, e.g., Collins '!. Commissioner, 
22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467 (1963). 
24. The Board of Tax Appeals and the Tax Court preferred the single-transaction approach. 
See, e.g., Crane v. Commisioner, 3 T.C. 585, 590-91 (1944), rev'd, 153 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1945), affd, 
331 U.S. 1 (1947); Lutz & Schamm Co. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 682, 689 (1943); Hotel Astoria, 42 
B.T.A. at 763. The Commissioner, however, preferred the separate-transaction approach, see, e.g., 
Peninsula Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 84, 91 (1942), that the Supreme Court ultimately 
adopted. See Crane, 331 U.S. at 11; United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938). The 
development of a clear rule was retarded by the Commissioner's tendency to assert a single· 
transaction analysis when that would produce a larger deficiency. See, e.g., Lutz, I T.C. at 687. 
25. Helvering v. American Chicle Co., 291 U.S. 426, 430 (1934). 
26. I.R.C. § 752(a) (1982) (increase in partner's share of partnership liabilities considered a 
contribution of money to partnership). 
27. /d. § 752(b) (1982) (decrease in partner's share of partnership liabilities considered a 
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a result, a partnership-level borrowing increases the aggregate tax basis 
of the partners' interests in the partnership by the amount borrowed. 
Furthermore, absent atypical changes in the partnership structure, the 
aggregate outside basis will equal the partnership's inside basis for its 
properties.28 Accordingly, the partners may generally claim losses gener-
ated by partnership operations in accordance with the normal timing 
rules of the Code.29 
For partnership taxation purposes, the character of the partnership 
borrowing is irrelevant. As long as the partnership is obligated to repay 
the debt,30 nonrecourse and recourse debts are treated identically. Fur-
thermore, the fact that all or a portion of a borrowing might not be 
repaid does not alter the tax consequences of the investment of the loan 
proceeds. Since the borrowing and the use of the proceeds are treated as 
separate transactions, the potential or actual failure to repay the debt 
does not affect the tax consequences of the property ownership. Rather, 
transactions involving the loan proceeds produce their own tax 
consequences. 31 
B. The Section 752 Regulations 
The Code, however, does not say which partners should be treated 
as making the constructive contribution of loan proceeds, and thus does 
not prescribe a method for allocating basis to the partners upon the 
expenditure of loan proceeds. In drafting regulations covering the alloca-
tion procedures, the Treasury Department equated a partner's right to a 
basis increase with his ultimate liability to repay the loan upon the failure 
of the partnership business.32 The regulations therefore attach great sig-
distribution of money to partner). The constructive distribution is then taxed as an actual cash 
distribution. Id. § 731 (1982). 
When the discharge of the liability also produces a deduction, as would the discharge of an 
account payable for supplies, the mandated reconstruction becomes more complicated. While the 
partner is treated as having repaid the creditor, the partnership claims the deduction and then 
allocates it to the partners according to the ratio for sharing tax losses. That ratio may not 
correspond to the ratio by which the partners are treated as having discharged the liability. 
28. This equality may be marred by transfers of partnership interests, thereby producing a new 
basis for the partnership interest, or by the suspension of losses in excess of a partner's basis for his 
partnership interest. 
29. The Code codified this result at I.R.C. § 752(c) (1982). The scope of this section, however, 
is limited by the caveat that a nonrecourse liability is to be treated as a recourse liability only to the 
extent of the fair market value of the encumbered property. Cf Crane, 331 U.S. at 14 n.37 
(reserving judgment on treatment of nonrecourse loans when amount of debt exceeds value of 
security). 
30. A partnership is obligated to repay a nonrecourse borrowing up to the amount of the 
security's fair market value. 
31. The propriety of this result is discussed infra in Part III. 
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960). 
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nificance to the state law concepts of general and limited partners, as well 
as to the distinctions between reconrse and nonrecourse borrowing. 
Under the regulations, when a partnership incurs a recourse loan, 
the resulting increase in basis is allocated solely to the general partners in 
the proportion determined by the partnership's loss-sharing ratio. 33 A 
limited partner who has no further obligation to contribute to the part-
nership, and thus no personal obligation to participate in the repayment 
of the loan, is not entitled to any increase in basis. 34 
This principle suggests that when a partnership incurs a nonre-
course obligation, none of the partners are entitled to a basis adjustment, 
since none of the partners have a personal obligation to repay the debt. 
That conclusion, however, is clearly incorrect under both Crane and sec-
tion 752. Thus, the regulations permit all members of either a generaP5 
or limited partnership to increase the basis for their partnership interests 
in the proportion in which partnership profits are allocated among the 
partners-presumably because those profits, rather than individually 
owned assets, are the source of the nonrecourse loan's repayment. 36 
C The Failure of the Regulatory Solution 
1. The Lack of Principled Justification 
The regulations thus adopt the separate-transaction approach for 
general partners37 but resurrect the single-transaction approach for lim-
ited partners in the case of a recourse borrowing. Consequently, limited 
partners are denied any basis adjustment attributable to expenditures 
made from the proceeds of a partnership's recourse borrowing. As both 
Congress and the Supreme Court seemingly rejected the single-transac-
tion approach to the computation of basis in other situations, the current 
use of that approach for limited partnerships requires a compelling legal 
or economic justification. 
Obviously, the principles established in Crane do not support this 
regulatory pattern. The Treasury Department presumably imposed this 
33. Id. 
34. The regulations under § 704(b) governing the allocation of partnership items draw a 
similar distinction. Rather than distinguishing between general and limited partners, the regulations 
distinguish between partners by the existence of an obligation to restore deficits in their capital-
account balances upon liquidation. See Trens. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2) (1985). Such a deficit 
could occur if losses attributable to the expenditure of loan proceeds were allocated to a partner in 
excess of the amount of his equity investment. 
35. The regulations do not specifically address the allocation of basis attributable to a 
nonrecourse borrowing by a general partnership. However, the logic of the regulations suggests that 
the allocation should be in proportion to the profit-sharing ratio, since this is the formula followed 
for limited partnerships. 
36. See 1 W. McKEE, W. NELSON, & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 13, at§ 8.01(1). 
37. The use of the loss-sharing ratio in the allocation, however, is questionable. See infra Part 
II. 
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relatively harsh treatment upon limited partners in activities not moti-
vated by tax concerns because limited partners are insulated from eco-
nomic losses that exceed their investment in the partnership, as enhanced 
by accumulated profits. 38 Mrs. Crane, however, enjoyed the same degree 
of insulation. The nonrecourse loan burdening her property at the time 
it was inherited equalled the unencumbered value of the property, and 
therefore she could not have sustained an economic loss. 
The narrow issue presented to the Supreme Court in Crane was 
whether the separate-transaction system previously adopted for recourse 
indebtedness should apply to nonrecourse loans. The Supreme Court 
agreed with the Commissioner's contention that Mrs. Crane had a tax 
basis in the property that included the amount of the debt, and thus was 
entitled to depreciation deductions from that basis. 39 Rejecting the con-
trary position adopted by the Tax Court,40 the Supreme Court held that 
as long as the fair market value of the encumbered property exceeded the 
amount of the indebtedness, the tax consequences of recourse and nonre-
course financing were to be identical. 41 
The regulations under section 752 take the opposite approach. 
Indeed, the regulations are fundamentally inconsistent with Crane, for 
they adopt the distinction between recol,lfse and nonrecourse debt that 
Crane had discarded and give each type· of indebtedness a different treat-
ment. While a limited partner cannot claim a basis increase attributable 
to a recourse borrowing, he shares equally with general partners in the 
basis increase attributable to a nonrecourse borrowing. 42 Furthermore, 
while the basis increase attributable to a recourse borrowing is allocated 
in accordance with the loss-sharing ratio, the basis increase attributable 
to a nonrecourse debt is allocated in accordance with the profit-sharing 
ratio.43 As a result, the regulations revest in the tax system the complexi-
ties that Crane had largely eliminated. 
These regulations might be justified if the nature of partnership 
indebtedness had economic significance. From the limited partner's per-
spective, however, it matters little whether the partnership finances its 
operations through recourse or nonrecourse debt. The obligation to 
38. The Senate Committee on Finance noted this fact and with respect to tax shelters, 
concluded that "it is not equitable to allow these individual investors to defer tax on income from 
other sources through losses generated by tax sheltering activities, to the extent the losses exceed the 
amount of actual investment the taxpayer has placed at risk in the investment." S. REP. No. 938, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 3481, 3482. 
While it only discusses tax shelters, however, § 465 clearly applies to all limited partnerships. 
39. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947). 
40. Crane v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 585 (1944), rev'd, 153 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1945), a.ffd, 331 
u.s. 1 (1947). 
41. Crane, 331 U.S. at 14. 
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960). 
43. /d. 
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repay a nonrecourse debt is, of course, limited to the value of the prop-
erty securing the debt. If the value of the security falls below the face 
amount of the loan, the lender might not be repaid in full. By virtue of 
the nonrecourse aspect of the loan agreement, some portion of the eco-
nomic loss incurred by the partnership is in effect shifted to the lender. 
On the other hand, in the event of default on a recourse debt, the 
lender may reach other assets of the partnership. Should those other 
assets be insufficient to discharge the debt, the lender, at least in theory, 
may reach the separate assets of the general partners. However, in no 
event may the lender reach any of the limited partner's assets not dedi-
cated to the partnership. Pursuant to the partnership agreement, the 
limited partners are not obligated to repay any portion of the indebted-
ness, and may shift that economic burden to the general partners. 
Whether the loss is shifted to the lender under the loan agreement or to 
the general partner under the partnership agreement is of no economic 
consequence to the limited partner. Accordingly, at least from the lim-
ited partner's perspective, the regulations create vast differences in tax 
results that are not accompanied by any underlying economic 
justifications. 
If the loan is with recourse, the tax penalty of the basis allocation is 
particularly egregious, for the limited partners may actually bear part of 
the economic loss. Should the value of the partnership assets be sufficient 
to repay the debt, the limited and general partners will in fact share the 
economic burden of repaying the loan. However, the limited partners 
will not have received an increase in basis attributable to the loan they 
helped repay.44 The system's purported rationale thus may conflict with 
economic realities in many situations. 
The justification for this harsh treatment of limited partners must 
therefore lie in the greater potential liability of general partners for 
recourse loans. However, closer examination reveals that this contingent 
economic liability does not justify the deviation from a separate-transac-
tion approach to partnership debt. Most partnerships do not become 
bankrupt, and hence they discharge their debts with partnership assets. 
Moreover, unless the partnership assets were overvalued at the time of 
the loan, even a bankrupt partnership will normally discharge more of its 
debt with partnership assets than with the separate assets of its general 
partners. As a result, the economic burden of repaying partnership debt 
with partnership assets is greater than the economic burden of discharg-
ing partnership debt with the separate assets of the general partners. 
44. While the limited partners may obtain an increase in basis as the partnership derives the 
income that is used to repay the loan, that basis will not have been available in the prior years when 
the partnership losses may have been incurred. In some eases, that income will not be realized until 
partnership properties are applied to the repayment of the loan. 
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Difficulties in collecting from the general partners further diminish 
the economic significance of this potential liability. Because state law 
imposes substantial procedural obstacles to the collection of deficiency 
judgments45 and, perhaps, because lenders do not want to damage cus-
tomer relations, secured creditors typically do not pursue deficiency 
judgments against general partners. Thus, even though access to a gen-
eral partner's personal assets may be necessary to repay the loan fully, 
this legal liability does not commonly produce an actual economic 
detriment. 
In practice, therefore, it is of little economic significance to a general 
partner whether the partnership incurs a recourse or a nonrecourse debt. 
For the regulations to permit these technical arrangements to produce 
substantial differences in tax effects is simply inappropriate. By allocat-
ing basis, and thus the ability to claim losses from the investment of part-
nership funds, as a function of potential liability for repayment, the 
regulations place undue weight upon the improbable, pathological case 
and iguore the probable, normal case. Since most partnership debt is 
discharged without invoking the personal liability of the general part-
ners, that potential liability should play little, if any, role in the allocation 
of basis. 
2. Abuses and Responses 
The regulatory pattern under section 752 has always drawn criti-
cism. One commentator characterized the treatment of limited partners 
as absurd, 46 and others have suggested that the regulations be revised. 47 
Nevertheless, those regulations precipitated little controversy in the 
twenty years following their adoption, presumably because during that 
period the Commissioner paid relatively little attention to the intricacies 
of partnership taxation.48 In the 1970's, however, the Commissioner and 
Congress began to move more aggressively against abuses by the tax shel-
ter industry. The "at-risk" rules of section 465,49 one of the techniques 
adopted to curb such abuses, followed the section 752 regulations in dis-
tinguishing between recourse and nonrecourse indebtedness. As a result, 
the distinctior.~ drawn by the section 752 regulations came under great 
45. CAL. Clv. PROC. CODE §§ 580a, 580b (West 1976). See generally G. OSBORNE, G. 
NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL EsTATE FINANCE LAW§§ 8.1 -8.3, at 524-36 (1979). 
46. Hill, Bases of Partnership Interests, 15 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 57, 68 (1957). 
47. See Epstein, The Application of the Crane Doctrine to Limited Partnerships, 45 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 100 (1972); Perry, Limited Partnerships and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule Goes Public, 27 TAX 
L. REV. 525 (1972). 
48. Professor Zeitlin has noted that "over the years [there have been] relatively few partnership 
audits and hence few cases . • . • [T]he problem in the partr.ership field has generally been too few 
cases rather than too many." Zeitlan, Foreword to 1 W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, 
supra note 13, at vi. 
49. I.R.C. § 465 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
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pressure as practitioners probed the lines between recourse and nonre-
course indebtedness on the one hand, and between a limited and general 
partner on the other. That pressure quickly exposed the errors inherent 
in those regulations. 
Observers have long recognized that while the regulations create 
burdensome complexity for bona fide commercial partnerships, 50 they do 
little, if anything, to interfere with the tax-reduction objectives of the 
well-advised taxpayer. Small business partnerships, for example, typi-
cally assign limited interests to inactive family members or to employees. 
Not uncommonly, those limited partners have relatively small capital 
accounts. There is no apparent reason why limited partners who will be 
taxed on a percentage of partnership profits used to repay a loan should 
not also be entitled to claim a corresponding percentage of deductions 
produced by the expenditure of the loan proceeds. 51 Under the current 
section 752 regulations, however, limited partners may not deduct losses 
or expenses in excess of their cash investment and accumulated profits. 52 
Rather, these deductions are deferred until the limited partner's capital 
account is enlarged either by a further investment or by an allocation of 
profits. 53 While the taxpayer may subsequently claim those deductions, 
their value is diminished by the deferral of the tax benefit. 
To avoid this deferral, many partnerships specially allocate losses in 
excess of a limited partner's investment to the general partners even 
though that special allocation is inconsistent with the general business 
objectives of the partnership. 54 Since the general partners are frequently 
in a higher tax bracket than are the family members or employees who 
are the limited partners, the regnlations encourage, if not force, tax plan-
ning that the parties otherwise would not have adopted. 
Sophisticated taxpayers may also manipulate the regulations by sim-
ply redefining partnership obligations, thereby altering the technical legal 
relationships among the partners and allowing for a more favorable allo-
cation ofbasis. This manipulation of the section 752 regulations can, and 
does, occur because taxpayers have come to understand that their techni-
cal obligations, while important for determining tax liability, rarely result 
in economic consequences. 55 
By creating a conflict between the lender's need for adequate secur-
50. See, e.g., Block v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 546 (1980). 
51. Part III of this Article considers and rejects the technical objection that these partners will 
not bear the economic burden of those losses. 
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-l(e) (1960). 
53. Id. § 1.704-1(d)(1) (1960), as amended by T.D. 6771, 29 Fed. Reg. 15,571 (1964). 
54. This reallocation is specifically permited by I.R.C. § 704(b) (1982). 
55. Under current law such manipulation is rarely required to obtain a right to increase basis; 
the partnership simply incurs nonrecourse liabilities. However, a partnership with recourse 
liabilities may increase a limited partner's basis by having the partner agree to make contributions to 
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ity and a limited partnership's desire for nonrecourse debt, the section 
752 regulations encourage taxpayers to blur the distinctions between 
recourse and nonrecourse liability. Governmental response to these 
manipulations has been mixed. In Long v. Commissioner, 56 for example, 
the Tax Court computed the basis of general partnership interests when 
some of the partners had personally guaranteed a portion of an otherwise 
nonrecourse mortgage. The section 752 regulations require that an 
increase in basis be allocated to all of the partners in accordance with the 
profit-sharing ratio only when "none of the partners have any personal 
liability" with respect to the loan. 57 Since some of the partners had 
incurred some personal liability, the court treated the entire loan as a 
recourse obligation and allocated basis to the general partners in accord-
ance with the loss-sharing ratio. 58 
Three years later the Commissioner adopted a contrary position, 
and ruled that a partial-recourse note should be treated as two separate 
obligations, with the basis allocation made separately with respect to 
each segment of the divided note. 59 To the extent of any personal liabil-
ity, the basis increase shonld be allocated in accordance with the rules 
governing recourse liabilities. The adjustment attributable to the balance 
of the note should then be allocated to all partners in accordance with 
their interest in partnership profits. 60 
The Tax Court's resolution of the allocation problem in Arthur Long 
is less than satisfactory. The court's decision would treat the entire 
amount of an outstanding nonrecourse note as a recourse obligation if a 
single partner personally guaranteed repayment of an insignificant frac-
tion of the obligation. Such an economically insignificant act would not 
only invoke a different ratio for the allocation of basis, thus precipitating 
constructive contributions and distributions among the partners, but 
would also, and far more dramatically, exclude limited partners from the 
allocation. Furthermore, taxpayers wishing to avoid the consequences of 
Arthur Long would have probed the possibilities of dividing a single note 
the partnership in the future. See 1 W. McKEE, W. NElSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 13, § 8.03 
(risk assumed by the limited partner may be ''modest," depending upon adequacy of security). 
The allocation regulations under § 704(b) may expand the use of such techniques. Under those 
regulations, special allocations may be sustained more easily if the partners are required to restore 
deficits in their capital accounts upon withdrawal from the partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(ri)(c) (1985). Apparently, some limited partnerships are now requiring deficit restoration, 
although they do not contemplate that the limited partners will actually be required to make 
payments to the partnership. 
56. 77 T.C. 1045 (1981). In keeping with general tax parlance, this case will be referred to in 
the text as Arthur Long. 
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960). 
58. Long, 11 T.C. at 1075. 
59. Rev. Rul. 84-118, 1984-2 C.B. 120. This ruling subsequently was clarified. See Treas. 
Announcement 85-19, 1985-5 I.R.B. 31. 
60. Rev. Rul. 84-118, 1984-2 C.B. 120. 
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into two separate obligations, each being entitled to the treatment the 
Commissioner ultimately conceded was available for all partial-recourse 
notes. 
Moreover, other Code sections also prescribe different tax conse-
quences for recourse and nonrecourse indebtedness. Under the at-risk 
rules of section 465, for example, taxpayers may not claim losses attribu-
table to the expenditure of a nonrecourse loan, 61 although no such limita-
tions obtain for deductions attributable to a recourse liability. The 
approach to recourse obligations adopted in Arthur Long is not accepta-
ble for the purposes of section 465, for it would permit taxpayers to avoid 
the limitations of that section by entering into an economically insignifi-
cant guarantee. Accordingly, the Arthur Long approach might treat an 
obligation as a recourse debt for basis allocation purposes, but as a non-
recourse debt for the purposes of section 465. While that sort of incon-
sistency is not alien to the Code, it is an obviously undesirable source of 
confusion and complexity. 
The Commissioner's ruling avoided all of the arbitrariness and com-
plexity inherent in Arthur Long. However, the ruling points out the flaw 
in the distinction between recourse and nonrecourse debt, for in the most 
common circumstances involving a partial-recourse loan, the ruling 
strips the distinction of all meaning. The justification for different tax 
consequences of recourse and nonrecourse borrowing must lie in the 
greater likelihood that a nonrecourse borrowing will not be repaid. 
However, to the extent that a nonrecourse indebtedness is adequately 
secured, the distinction evaporates. With an adequate partial guarantee, 
the lender as a practical matter is as likely to be paid in full as he would 
be if the loan were with recourse.62 Under the Commissioner's ruling, 
however, a taxpayer can effectively create a recourse debt, yet preserve 
part of the favorable allocation of basis attributable to nonrecourse 
indebtedness. 63 
As between these two approaches to partial-recourse indebtedness, 
the Commissioner's present position is vastly more practical, although it 
61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.465-25(b)(l)(l) (proposed June 5, 1979). 
62. In its study of this issue, the American Law Institute conceded that a partial-recourse debt 
is indistinguishable from a recourse debt, provided there is no reasonable chance of the security's 
value falling below the amount of the guarantee. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER K 273 (1984) [hereinafter cited as "ALI PROPOSAL"}. Nevertheless, 
the ALI endorsed the Commissioner's treatment of such a borrowing as two separate notes with the 
resulting basis to be allocated separately. /d. 
63. The Treasury Department has attempted to penalize this technique through the proposed 
regulations under § 704(b). Under those regulations, losses are treated as attributable first to 
recourse borrowing and only thereafter to nonrecourse borrowing. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(4)(iv) 
(proposed March 9, 1983); id. § 1.704-l(b)(S) example 17(i). As a result, the first losses incurred by 
a partnership having a dual financing arrangement do not fall within the safe harbor rule applicable 
to losses attributable to nonrecourse indebtedness. 
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is also far more favorable to the tax shelter industry. The point, how-
ever, is that there is no satisfactory resolution to these sorts of questions 
because the regulatory distinction between recourse and nonrecourse 
indebtedness does not reflect a substantial economic reality. 
Techniques involving partner guarantees or other obligations that 
do not flow from the loan agreement are functionally similar to partial-
recourse indebtedness. Consider a limited partnership that owns prop-
erty subject to a nonrecourse liability. All of the partners' tax bases 
therefore reflect an adjustment attributable to that borrowing. Assume 
further that the partnership is having trouble making the loan payments. 
To prevent foreclosure, the partnership agrees to assume the obligations 
on the loan. That assumption, of course, increases the exposure of the 
limited partners to liability. Prior to the assumption, the limited partners 
only risked the loss of their share of the encumbered property; now, they 
also risk the forfeiture of their interest in other partnership assets. Nev-
ertheless, the section 752 regulations remove the amount of the loan from 
the tax basis of the limited partnership interests. 64 In an attempt to pre-
vent that result, the limited partners personally obligate themselves to 
repay all or a portion of the borrowing.65 The limited partners thus have 
assumed an actual financial obligation with respect to the loan indistin-
guishable from the liability of a general partner. A rule of law that 
would not permit those limited partners to include an allocable portion 
of the borrowing in the basis for their partnership interests, to say the 
least, would be untenable. 
The regulations, however, produce precisely this undesirable result. 
The regulations allocate basis attributable to recourse liabilities only to 
general partners. 66 Without question, a limited partner guarantee does 
not cause that partner to become a general partner. Accordingly, the 
Tax Court has twice held that guarantees of recourse obligations by lim-
ited partners do not permit those partners to increase the basis for their 
partnership interests.67 That result, which seems mandated by the literal 
language of the regulations, is unreasonable. A limited partner who is 
personally obligated to repay a portion of a loan is not abusing the tax 
64. Id. § 1.752-1(f) (1960). 
65. That assumption might take the form of a guarantee running directly to the lender, or it 
might represent an indemnification of the general partners should the general partner be called upon 
to discharge the loan from personal assets. 
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960). 
67. Block v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 546 (1980); Brown v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 725 (1980). The Commissioner had previously ruled that indemnification of a general 
partner by a limited partner does not permit an increase in the limited partner's basis even if the 
indemnification is required by the limited partnership agreement. The Commissioner reached this 
result because the limited partner indemnified the general partner in his individual capacity, and 
thus was not obligated to contribute additional money to the partnership. Rev. Rul. 69-223, 1969-1 
C.B. 184. 
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system by attempting to claim a proportionate share of the losses attribu-
table to the expenditure of the proceeds. 
On the other hand, ignoring liabilities created by side agreements 
might work to the taxpayer's advantage. For instance, suppose a limited 
partnership is fonned to construct and operate an apartment building. 
The venture promises to be quite profitable but will produce tax losses in 
its early years due to accelerated cost recovery allowances. 68 In order for 
the limited partners to be able to claim those tax incentive allowances, 
the financing must be on a nonrecourse basis. The lender, however, 
refuses to make a nonrecourse loan. If side agreements have no effect 
upon basis allocations, it should follow that the general partner may per-
sonally guarantee the repayment of the loan without jeopardizing either 
the loan's nonrecourse character or the subsequent basis adjustment to 
the limited partners. 
In Raphan v. United States, 69 the Court of Claims agreed with this 
analysis. In that case, the general partners guaranteed a nonrecourse 
construction loan. The limited partners took title to the property subject 
to the security interest, but never assumed the loan. 70 The court cor-
rectly noted that the general partner's guarantee did not alter the eco-
nomic interests of the limited partners, since the guarantee had to be 
satisfied with the individual assets of the general partner. The court then 
concluded that the gnarantee did not alter the nonrecourse character of 
the loan.71 
Congress and the Treasury Department reacted swiftly. A horrified 
Commissioner immediately issued a public ruling to the contrary.72 
Congress enacted legislation providing that section 752 should be applied 
without regard to the result reached in Raphan.13 Moreover, Congress 
instructed the Treasury Department to amend the section 752 regula-
tions to provide for the treatment of all such side agreements. 74 The 
conference report on that somewhat unusual piece of legislation sug-
gested that the regulations should reflect the mamter in which partners 
actually bear the economic risk of loss, although the general structure of 
the regnlations should remain in place. 75 
The Treasury Department will have difficulties completing that 
assignment, for the problem of partner gnarantees cannot be logically 
68. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1986). 
69. 3 Ct. Cl. 457 (1983), rev'd in part, 159 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
70. /d. at 465. 
71. /d. at 465-66. 
72. Rev. RuL 83-151, 1983-2 C.B. 105. 
73. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 79(a), 98 Stat. 4494, 597 (1984). 
74. /d. § 79(b), 98 Stat. at 597. 
75. H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 868 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
Ao. NEws 697, 1556. 
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and consistently resolved within the context of the distinctions drawn 
under the section 752 regulations. As the Court of Claims observed in 
Raphan, it is economically irrelevant to the limited partner whether the 
general partners guarantee a nonrecourse debt.76 It is thus inappropriate 
dramatically to alter the tax consequences for the limited partner, as the 
Commissioner's ruling requires, on the basis of a shift in the risk of loss 
between the lender and the general partners. 
That improper result, however, is not a unique aspect of partner 
guarantees; rather, it is the result of the distinctions drawn in the regula-
tions between recourse and nonrecourse indebtedness, and between gen-
eral and limited partners. As already noted, the character of any 
partnership borrowing is of little relevance to a limited partner.77 The 
presence of a side agreement should be made irrelevant to the limited 
partners, but not by ignoring the agreement's financial consequences, as 
Raphan suggests. Since one of the borrowers will repay the debt, treating 
that debt as not involving personal liability would be irrational. Instead, 
the distinction drawn in the regulations between recourse and nonre-
course indebtedness, and between limited and general partners, should be 
eliminated. 
D. The Proposed Revisions of the American Law Institute 
The American Law Institute has attempted to resolve some of the 
deficiencies in the section 752 regulations. While endorsing the distinc-
tions between general and limited partners and between recourse and 
nonrecourse indebtedness, the ALI has proposed that side agreements 
and other arrangements altering the liabilities of partners be taken into 
account. 78 While this intermediate proposal will eliminate the major 
absurdities produced by the regulations, this proposal unavoidably 
increases the complexity of the section 752 regulations and may create 
inappropriate results of their own. 
Under the ALI proposal, for example, a limited partner who guar-
antees recourse partnership liabilities may adjust his outside basis with 
respect to the guaranteed debt. 79 Thus, the proposal does not eliminate 
the distinction between a general and limited partner; rather, it 
introduces a third factor, the existence of a guarantee. Unfortunately, 
the allocation suggested by this new factor may not be any more rational 
than the allocation produced under the prior rules. For example, con-
sider a limited partnership having two general partners and three limited 
partners, each having a twenty percent interest in profits and losses. If a 
76. Raphan, 3 Ct. CI. at 466. 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. 
78. ALl PROPOSAL, supra note 62, at 253-80. 
79. Id. at 274. 
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limited partner guarantees repayment of a partnership debt, he would 
apparently be entitled to a basis adjustment equal to one-third of the 
guaranteed obligation, even though his actual exposure to liability is far 
greater. On the other hand, the limited partner would apparently be 
entitled to this basis adjustment even if the obligation guaranteed was 
already fully secured, and thus as a practical matter did not alter the 
partner's exposure to liability. 
Another problem with the ALI proposal is its repudiation of 
Raphan. Like the Commissioner, the ALI would treat a nonrecourse 
liability guaranteed by a general or, apparently, a limited partner as a 
recourse liability, but only with respect to the guaranteeing partner. 80 
Notwithstanding the logical consistency of the ALI proposal, the practi-
cal consequences of this treatment of nonrecourse indebtedness are 
troubling. For example, nothing apparently prevents a limited partner 
from volunteering to guarantee a partnership's nonrecourse liability, 
should his basis be inadequate to absorb contemplated losses. This guar-
antee would shift the entire basis adjustment attributable to the liability 
from all other partners to the guaranteeing limited partner. Once again, 
that result would follow even if the liability were adequately secured and 
the guarantee had no non-tax consequences. 
The ALI's proposal giving effect to secondary liabilities of partners 
would improve the existing system, but nevertheless remains flawed. 
Since the fundamental distinctions drawn by the regulations and by the 
ALI generally have little, if any, economic significance, modifications 
based upon those distinctions can only draw different, but equally arbi-
trary lines. Moreover, the ALI proposal would increase the complexity 
of the basis allocation regulations. In turn, those complexities would 
increase the likelihood that taxpayers would be denied basis adjustments, 
and thus the ability to claim their anticipated share of partnership losses, 
because of insignificant technical changes in their legal relationships. 
The theoretical inconsistencies inherent in the section 752 regula-
tions persisted for two decades without being seriously questioned only 
because the consequences were universally ignored. Recent litigation has 
demonstrated that these regulations draw unnecessary and irrelevant dis-
tinctions and are unworkable in practice. In its impending revisions, the 
Treasury Department should abandon these distinctions and implement 
a system more consistent with the fundamental principles of the tax 
system. 
80. Id. at 273. 
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II 
ALLOCATION OF BASIS UNDER THE CRANE SYSTEM 
The distinctions made under the section 752 regulations do not 
make economic sense. That conclusion, however, does not reveal how 
basis should be allocated among the general and limited partners. This 
section will show how a system of basis allocation consistent with Crane 
and the spirit of section 752 would operate. . 
Reading Crane and section 752 together, all partners, regardless of 
potential relief from repayment, should be regarded as constructively 
borrowing the proceeds of a loan actually obtained at the partnership 
level and then constructively contributing the proceeds to the partner-
ship. For these purposes, it is irrelevant whether the borrowing is with 
or without recourse, or whether the borrower is a general or limited part-
nership. 81 Under Crane, basis allocation does not depend on an individ-
ual partner's potential relief from the obligation to discharge the 
indebtedness. 
Although neither Crane nor the aggregate approach adopted in Sub-
chapter K prescribes a method for allocating basis among partners, the 
allocation must be consistent with the concepts underlying these authori-
ties. Thus, the basis allocation should not be controlled by reference to 
the loan itself, but rather by reference to the ownership of property 
acquired with the proceeds. Basis, of course, represents the level of a 
taxpayer's investment in property. Accordingly, the basis a partner 
acquires in a partnership by virtue of a partnership borrowing should 
reflect the ownership or equity interest that the partner will acquire in 
partnership properties obtained through the expenditure of the loan pro-
ceeds. The ratio in which partners acquire an equity interest in partner-
ship properties, of course, is the ratio in which partnership profits are 
shared. 
Upon a partnership's obtaining a loan and using the proceeds to 
acquire property, no partner acquires an immediate equity interest in the 
property purchased because the value of the purchased asset is entirely 
offset by the obligation to repay the loan. However, as the partnership 
earns income and uses that income to repay the loan, the net worth of the 
partnership, and thus of its partners, increases. To the extent that part-
nership retains income or applies income to the repayment of its indebt-
81. In Crane, the Supreme Court specifically held that recourse and nonrecourse indebtedness 
are subject to the same pattern of taxation as long as the nonrecourse indebtedness resembles a full-
recourse borrowing. Crane, 331 U.S. at 14. That resemblance exists when the value of the 
encumbered property exceeds the amount of the liability, thus guaranteeing repayment. 
The Court, of course, did not address the distinction between general and limited partners. 
Nevertheless, for present purposes, the distinction between the two kinds of partners is analogous to 
the distinction between recourse and nonrecourse indebtedness, as both nonrecourse debtors and 
limited partners are partially protected from the full economic impact of certain losses. 
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edness, the tax basis and capital accounts of the individual partners will 
be increased in the ratio in which partnership profits are allocated. As 
the loan is repaid, however, the bases of the partners will be reduced. 82 
The net effect of this series of transactions is to convert the basis origi-
nally produced by the loan into a basis attributable to the partnership 
profits. 
The loan obtained by the partnership merely accelerated the time at 
which properties were acquired and therefore should not have any effect 
upon the ratio in which the partners are treated as owning those partner-
ship properties. Rather, the basis created by the loan should be viewed 
as an acceleration of the basis that would be obtained by the ultimate 
payment for the properties through the application of partnership profits 
to the retirement of the loan. Accordingly, replacing the loan proceeds 
with partnership profits as the source of payment for the partnership 
properties should not alter the ratio in which basis is allocated among the 
partners. That result can only be achieved if the initial allocation of basis 
attributable to the loan is allocated in the ratio in which profits are 
shared. 
The current approach to basis allocation can produce inappropriate 
results when a partnership shares losses and profits in different propor-
tions. Under the regulations, general partners share the basis increase 
resulting from a recourse loan according to the ratio in which they share 
losses. 83 If a partner assumes a greater proportion of partnership losses 
than profits, he can claim losses attributable to the expenditure of the 
proceeds at a rate faster than that at which he must report the profits 
used to repay the borrowing. Conversely, if a partner's proportionate 
interest in profits exceeds his interest in losses, allocating basis pursuant 
to the loss-sharing ratio will deny that partner the opportunity to report 
losses to the same extent he must report taxable profits. 
Assume, for example, that the two members of AB general partner-
ship share losses equally but allocate seventy percent of the profits to A 
and thirty percent to B. For simplicity, an equity investment by the part-
ners will be ignored. In year one, the partnership borrows $100; in year 
two the partnership earns $100, and in year three it repays the loan. 
Under current law, A and B each initially obtained a basis of $50 attribu-
table to the loan. After the allocation of the profits in year two, A's basis 
is increased to $120 while B's basis is only increased to $80. Upon the 
repayment of the loan in year three, the basis of each partner is reduced 
by $50, resulting in a basis of $70 for A and $30 for B. Those amounts 
will also be reflected in the partners' capital accounts and thus will repre-
sent their economic interests in the partnership. The resulting seventy-
82. See I.R.C. §§ 733(1), 752(b) (1982). 
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960). 
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thirty basis allocation accurately reflects the partners' economic interests 
in the partnership for it was produced by the allocation of profits and 
contains no adjustment attributable to a partnership loan. However, the 
initial fifty-fifty allocation of basis attributable to the loan required by the 
present regulations did not reflect the partners' economic interests in the 
partnership. That allocation was entirely arbitrary and improper. Under 
the allocation rules proposed here, the initial allocation of basis attributa-
ble to the loan would properly have been of $70 to A and $30 to B. 
On the other hand, had the partnership lost money in year two, B 
should not be able to deduct losses in excess of thirty percent of the 
amount borrowed, since he will only be taxed on thirty percent of the 
profits that will be used to repay the loan. 84 Similarly, subject to the 
limitation imposed by the loss-sharing agreement, A should be able to 
claim losses up to seventy percent of the amount borrowed, although 
present law would limit his deductions to fifty percent. 
The impropriety of current law becomes particularly apparent when 
the partnership fails to repay the debt in full, thereby generating cancel-
lation-of-indebtedness income. If the basis increase attributable to a loan 
has been allocated in accordance with the loss-sharing ratio, the cancella-
tion of the debt will produce a basis reduction in the same proportion. 
However, the partners will also be subject to cancellation-of-indebtedness 
income, producing a corresponding increase in their outside basis. Prop-
erly, the net effect should create no change in a partner's basis for his 
partnership interest, but the partner shonld be taxed on his share of the 
income generated by the cancellation. 85 Under the existing regulations, 
however, partners whose profit-sharing interests exceed their loss-sharing 
interests will be taxed on the cancellation of the loan in an amount 
greater than the amount of basis that they previously had by virtue of the 
borrowing. 
The unfairness inherent in this situation lies not in the allocation of 
the cancellation-of-indebtedness income, for the partners' profit-sharing 
ratio properly reflects the economic benefit received by virtue of the can-
cellation. Rather, the unfairness lies in the allocation of basis in accord-
ance with a loss-sharing ratio. That ratio deprives some partners of a 
portion of the basis attributable to the borrowing and assigns that basis 
to other partners. 
In addition, since a partner's basis is currently reduced in accord-
84. Of course, if the partnership cannot repay the loan and the partners are required to make 
contributions to the partnership, those contributions will increase the basis of their partnership 
interests and support claiming the loss. See I.R.C. § 722 (1982). Normally, those contributions will 
be made in proportion to the loss-sharing ratio. 
85. Under Crane, the cancellation of the loan does not affect basis, but does produce income on 
the loan transaction. Crane, 331 U.S. at 11, 12, 14. 
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ance with the loss-sharing ratio but increased in accordance with the 
profit-sharing ratio, the net basis adjustment caused by the cancellation 
of the debt in fact produces a shift in basis which ultimately conforms to 
the profit-sharing ratio. While this results in the proper allocation, the 
basis shift is artificial and unnecessary. For example, assume that in gen-
eral partnership PL, P is entitled to sixty percent of the profits and L is 
charged with sixty percent of the losses. If the partnership obtains a one-
hundred dollar recourse loan and buys property with the proceeds, forty 
dollars of basis will be allocated to P and sixty dollars will be allocated to 
L. Ignoring any changes that might be produced by partnership income 
or loss, a cancellation of the debt will reduce each partner's basis to 
zero. 86 However, sixty dollars of the income generated by the cancella-
tion will be allocated to P and forty dollars will be allocated to L, thereby 
increasing their respective bases by those amounts. 
As a result, P will be taxed as if he had received and retained sixty 
dollars, although prior to the cancellation he was a constructive bor-
rower of only forty dollars. The cancellation, in effect, produces a shift 
in basis of twenty dollars from L to P. This shifting basis is irrational 
because the transactions have no net economic significance. The ultimate 
basis allocation, however, is rational because the profit-sharing ratio 
defines a partner's interest in the burden of repaying the indebtedness. 
Under the proposal made here, this shifting of basis would not 
occur. The allocation of basis from the loan would correspond to the 
same profit-sharing ratio in which the cancellation-of-indebtedness 
income would be allocated. Thus, upon a cancellation, the reduction in 
basis from the repayment and the increase in basis from the income 
would be identical. In addition, each partner would be taxed on an 
amount that precisely equaled the economic benefit that had been 
obtained from the loan now cancelled. 
III 
THE "AT-RISK" CONCEPT AND THE PROPER CALCULATION 
OF CANCELLATION-OF-INDEBTEDNESS INCOME 
Discerning the proper basis allocation at the partnership level does 
not end the analysis. The proposed basis allocations would allow some 
partners to take deductions attributable to borrowed funds although they 
remained free of any obligation to repay the loan. Consequently, some 
partners might never incur economic losses equivalent to the tax losses 
that the basis allocation permitted them to claim. That result is entirely 
consistent with the principles of Crane but is not consistent with the "at-
86. See I.R.C. §§ 732(1), 752(b) (1982). 
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risk" concept of section 465.87 If the justifications for the expansion of 
Crane suggested earlier in this Article are theoretically sound, then the 
concepts and policies underlying the at-risk rules are not. 
The policy issues involved in this debate are not unique to partner-
ships. The proper tax treatment of any nonrecourse borrower should 
determine the treatment of any limited partner or of any partner in a 
partnership that borrows on a nonrecourse basis. Therefore, this section 
will analyze how the full extension of Crane would apply to individual 
purchasers of property. The analysis then will be extended to cover both 
general and limited partnerships that borrow money on a nonrecourse 
basis. 
A. Borrowers in General 
When the loan involves personal liability, the tax system does not 
limit deductions and losses attributable to the spending of loan pro-
ceeds. 88 This result is, of course, theoretically sound. If a loan bears a 
market rate of interest, the amount borrowed will equal the present value 
of the obligation to repay the principal with interest. The receipt of loan 
proceeds, therefore, does not change a borrower's net worth and does not 
increase the borrower's income. 
On the other hand, the expenditure of the loan proceeds does pro-
duce a decrease in the borrower's net worth, just as if the expenditure 
were from the borrower's own assets. If a loss or expense resulting from 
the expenditure would be deductible had the taxpayer expended his own 
funds, the same result should therefore follow from the expenditure of 
loan proceeds. 
It would, of course, be possible to tax loans on a cash-flow basis by 
including the loan proceeds in taxable income and permitting a deduc-
tion upon repayment. That system, however, would reduce the after-tax 
proceeds available to the taxpayer. While a deduction upon repayment 
would correspondingly reduce the present value of the obligation to 
repay, it would not affect the present value of the interest to be paid. 
Accordingly, the present value of the obligations to pay interest and to 
repay the loan would exceed the amount of the after-tax proceeds of the 
loan available to the taxpayer. 
For example, the present value of the obligation to repay a $100 
loan in ten years, discounted at an after-tax interest rate of eight percent, 
is approximately $45. The present value of the obligation to pay the 
interest on that loan, compounded semi-annually, is $55. Thus, the pres-
ent value of the repayment burden offsets the $100 of proceeds. Now 
87. I.R.C. § 465 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
88. See supra note 19. 
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suppose the borrower were subject to a tax rate of forty percent and the 
receipt of the proceeds were taxable. The taxpayer would then receive 
after-tax proceeds of $60. If the repayment of the principal were deducti-
ble, the burden of repayment would be reduced to a future value of $60, 
and a present value of $27. The present value of the interest obligation 
would not change. Thus, the present value of the obligation to repay the 
loan would be the sum of $27 and $55, or $82. The taxpayer, however, 
ouly received $60 after taxes. Consequently, this treatment of the bor-
rowing would produce an after-tax economic loss to the taxpayer. 89 
The less favorable results produced under the cash-flow approach to 
the taxation of loans is not surprising; the imposition of tax in exchange 
for a deferred deduction will always be unfavorable to the taxpayer. The 
less favorable treatment, however, is not justifiable, for the cash-flow 
approach causes the burden of repayment to exceed the benefit obtained 
from the loan. This suggests that the separate-transaction approach is the 
preferable method of loan taxation. 
However, there is another aspect to the separate-transaction system 
of accounting for indebtedness. Not ouly does the receipt of loan pro-
ceeds not constitute taxable income, but the expenditure of the proceeds 
is given its normal tax consequence. Altering either aspect of this system 
improperly increases the tax cost of borrowing. While the impropriety of 
including loan proceeds in taxable income is generally acknowledged, it 
has not been as uniformly recognized that it would be improper to penal-
ize the expenditure of the loan proceeds. The at-risk rules, for example, 
bar many deductions derived from the expenditure of the proceeds of a 
nonrecourse loan. 90 Disallowing legitimate deductions because they are 
attributable to the expenditure of borrowed money in effect imposes a tax 
cost on borrowing. Indeed, the after-tax effect of disallowing these 
deductions would be precisely the same as directly taxing the loan, since 
the disallowance of a deduction is the equivalent of an increase in taxable 
income by the same amount. 
B. Nonrecourse Debt and the Relevance of the Obligation to Repay 
As noted, one of the justifications for the at-risk rules is the concern 
that a borrower not personally obligated to repay the full amount of a 
loan will in fact not repay.91 The courts, however, have developed far 
more direct ways to treat similar situations. For example, when someone 
89. This example also helps illustrate why a cash-flow treatment of debt might be appropriate 
under a different tax system. Under a cash-flow consumption tax, for example, the theoretical tax 
imposed upon the receipt of the loan proceeds and of the income produced by the investment of 
those proceeds would be deferred until those amounts were consumed. See Andrews, A 
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1113, ll67-69 (1974). 
90. See I.R.C. § 465 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
91. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
1986] BASIS ALLOCATION 65 
purports to borrow money but is not obliged or does not intend to repay 
the borrowing, the purported borrower is usually taxed because he is in 
receipt of compensation92 or another form of income. 93 The logic is that 
if a receipt is not intended to be repaid, the receipt is not a loan and 
should not be treated as such for tax purposes. Thus, unless the receipt is 
specifically excluded from the income tax base,94 it should be subject to 
an immediate tax. -
Once treated as taxable income, however, the expenditure of this 
income should have the same tax consequences as the expenditure of 
funds derived from any other source. The source of the money in a pur-
ported loan should have no bearing upon the tax consequences of a sub-
sequent transaction in which property is acquired. In other words, 
assumptions concerning the chances of a loan's repayment may affect the 
tax consequences of the receipt of the proceeds, but they should not be 
relevant to the tax consequences of the expenditure of the proceeds.95 
Both nonrecourse loans and limited partnerships raise the possibility 
that a transaction initially appearing to constitute a loan may eventually 
resemble the receipt of taxable income. In either case, money may be 
transferred subject to an obligation to repay, ouly to have the borrower 
default and leave the lender without the ability to collect the full amount 
of the loan. These loans thus contain -uncertainty both as to whether 
repayment will occur and as to the proper tax consequences of the trans-
action.96 However, both logic and Crane suggest that this uncertainty 
should only affect taxation of the receipt-not the use-of the borrowed 
92. Collins v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467 (1963) (In holding that taxpayer's receipt 
of $15,000 in exchange for nonrecourse note secured by property worth $300 was not a gift, court 
implied it was taxable income.). 
93. Cj. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (embezzled money taxable as income). 
94. Some exclusions from income are listed in I.R.C. §§ 101-127 (1982 & Snpp. II 1984). 
95. The Snpreme Court has not clearly grasped this distinction. In Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 
U.S. 300 (1983), the Court based its current treatment of recourse loan expenditures on an 
"assumption" that the borrowing would be repaid. Id. at 308. As the previous discussion illustrates, 
that equation is improper. The potential failure of repayment should have no bearing upon the tax 
consequences of the use of the loan proceeds. Consequently, the assumption that a borrowing will be 
repaid shonld have no bearing upon the tax consequences of the expenditure of the proceeds. 
The Court's failure to grasp the distinction is somewhat surprising, for lower courts have 
distinguished between borrowed money and taxable income in other contexts. In Collins v. 
Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467 (1963), for example, the taxpayer purported to borrow 
$15,000, issning in exchange a nonrecourse note secured by property worth $300. When the value of 
the security had dropped to $100, the holder returned both the security and the note to the taxpayer. 
The Tax Court readily determined that the transaction yielded cancellation-of-indebtedness income 
in the amount of $100. Although not confronted with the issue, the court further implied that in the 
year of the purported borrowing the taxpayer realized $14,700 in immediately taxable compensation. 
See also infra note 132. 
96. Indeed, when a borrower issues a nonrecourse note in exchange for property, it may be 
uncertain whether the seller has received anything at all. Particularly in the more abusive tax 
shelters, the face amonnt of the nonrecourse note may exceed any demonstrable value for the 
property acquired. 
66 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:41 
proceeds. If the tax consequences of the expenditure are unaffected by 
whether the receipt is a nontaxable loan that will be repaid or is taxable 
income that will be retained, those consequences should follow despite 
the intermediate possibility that repayment will not occur. 
The at-risk concept, however, produces a different result. Section 
465 denies taxpayers certain tax deductions attributable to the expendi-
ture of the proceeds of nonrecourse borrowing. Losses attributable to the 
property acquired may only be claimed against profits generated in the 
same activity or against future equity investments.97 Accordingly, the 
uncertainty created by the fact that a nonrecourse borrowing might not 
be fully repaid affects the deductions attributable to the expenditure of 
the proceeds. 
Penalizing the property transaction because of the uncertainty cre-
ated by the character of the borrowing can only be justified if the stan-
dard tax rules do not produce an appropriate tax liability. If the correct 
tax liability is imposed under Crane and the separate-transaction system 
upon the failure to repay a nonrecourse borrowing, then the at-risk con-
cept imposes an unjust penalty and is technically unnecessary. 
1. Repayment 
The uncertainty created by nonrecourse indebtedness will be 
resolved in one of two ways. The borrower will either repay the debt or 
obtain a full or partial cancellation of his obligation under the loan agree-
ment. If the debt is repaid in full, the application of the at-risk penalty 
will prove to have been unnecessary and excessively harsh. Notwith-
standing the initial uncertainty, the borrower will have borne the full 
economic burden attributable to his transaction in precisely the same 
manner as a recourse borrower. Thus, if it could be accurately predicted 
that a nonrecourse loan would be repaid in full, it would be improper to 
penalize the nonrecourse borrower through deferring his ability to claim 
deductions. 
Furthermore, the form of repayment is not material. A debt is 
repaid when a borrower transfers to the lender cash or property having a 
value equal to the outstanding balance of the loan. Of course, the trans-
fer of property to the lender should be treated as though the transferor 
sold the property to a third party and used the proceeds of the sale to 
discharge the debt.98 However, there is no abuse of tax policy in treating 
97. I.R.C. §§ 465(a)(2), 465(b)(l)(A) (1982). 
98. That is, to the extent that the value of the property transferred in repayment exceeds its tax 
basis, the transfer must produce a gain to the transferor. Under the proposed system, if the amount 
of the liability extinguished exceeds the value of the property, the difference would constitute a 
partial cancellation of the debt and would be taxed as such. See infra notes 100-04 and 
accompanying text. 
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a direct transfer of property to the lender as repayment. The borrower 
has parted with value as fully as if he had repaid the debt with cash. 
Nor does it matter that the property transferred is the property that 
secured the borrowing or, if the initial receipt of the property represented 
a genuine purchase,99 that the property was initially acquired from the 
lender. Those transactions must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that 
they represent an actual purchase and an actual debt; however, if the 
initial transaction was negotiated in good faith, the manner of discharg-
ing the resulting liability is irrelevant. In each circumstance, the tax-
payer has parted with an economic value and has thereby discharged a 
liability. 
2. Failure to Repay 
If the at-risk concept is not technically justifiable when a nonre-
course debt is actually repaid, its justification must be that the general 
tax rules produce an improper tax liability when the loan is forgiven. In 
fact, however, those rules can produce an adequate tax liability, although 
a minor modification in present law is necessary in some circumstances. 
When a recourse loan is not repaid, the cancellation-of-indebtedness 
doctrine established in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. 100 causes the 
borrower to be taxed on the amount of indebtedness forgiven. This result 
is quite proper. To the extent that the taxpayer receives value that he 
will not repay, he derives an accretion to wealth that should be included 
in his tax base. Thus, when the assumption that a loan will be repaid 
proves erroneous, a tax should be imposed to the same extent as if the 
receipt of the loan proceeds constituted income. 
In the context of nonrecourse debt, when the uncertainty of repay-
ment is resolved by a failure to repay, the receipt should be treated as 
generating taxable income. Regardless of a borrower's personal liability, 
a cancellation of debt results in an increase in personal wealth 101 that 
99. Problems of genuine purchase have often arisen for the courts. For example, when 
repayment is contingent upon deriving income or profit from an investment, the courts have 
properly regarded the amouut payable under the note as too speculative to permit the transaction to 
be brought within the Crane system. See, e.g., Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041, 
1047-48 (5th Cir. 1981). Similarly, when the surrounding circumstances demonstrate not ouly that a 
taxpayer does uot intend to discharge a purchase money obligation but also that at all times it would 
be economically irrational for him to do so, the courts have concluded that the transaction does not 
represent a boua fide purchase and have denied the taxpayer the tax consequences of the ownership 
of the property. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 
1976). The results in these cases are entirely sound and would not be altered by the proposal made 
here. 
100. 284 u.s. 1, 3 (1931). 
101. While it seems clear that the cancellation of a nourecourse debt does increase income, the 
issue has not been finally resolved by the courts. See infra note 132. Moreover, the amount and 
character of that income, when joined with a transfer of property, are still debated questions. See, 
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should be included in a taxpayer's personal income. Kirby Lumber con-
tains nothing to the contrary, and its extension to nonrecourse debt is 
perfectly consonant with Crane and the principles contained therein. 102 
In one important respect, however, the tax imposed under Kirby 
Lumber differs from the tax that would have been imposed had the 
receipt been treated as income when received. Under Kirby Lumber, the 
tax is imposed at the time an indebtedness is cancelled, and not at the 
time of the purported borrowing. 103 This tax deferral may provide an 
excessively favorable benefit to taxpayers. With the aid of hindsight, it is 
apparent that a taxpayer who defaults on a nonrecourse loan obtained 
income but managed to defer the corresponding tax for the life of the 
liability. Furthermore, the taxpayer may have spent that income in a 
manner that generated tax deductions which were taken before the debt 
was cancelled. The apparent deferral of tax and the resulting mis-
matching of income and deduction may thus provide the major technical 
justification for the at-risk concept. 
a. Cancellation in General 
With perfect foresight, the Commissioner could subject only the 
amount of the loan that would not be repaid to current taxation. That 
omniscience would eliminate the need for the at-risk concept. There 
could be no objection to deducting the expenditure of income already 
taxed since the potential mismatching of income and deductions would 
have been eliminated. 
Even if such foresight were possible, it would not be proper to tax 
the entire amount of principal destined not to be repaid as long as the 
taxpayer continues to pay interest on the loan. These interest payments 
cause the taxpayer to obtain only a partial cancellation of the debt. 
While the receipt of the proceeds may no longer be offset by the present 
value of the obligation to repay the principal, they remain offset by the 
present value of the obligation to pay interest. Accordingly, if perfect 
e.g., Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Rosenberg, Better To Burn Out than Fade Away? 
The Consequences of the Disposition of a Tax Shelter, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 87 (1983). 
102. The cancellation-of-indebtedness doctrine will not produce taxable income if the taxpayer 
validly elects to either reduce the basis of depreciable properties or otherwise forego tax benefits. 
I.R.C. §§ 108(c), 1017 (1982). Whenever available, this relief reduces the tax imposed under Kirby 
Lumber and prevents the achievement of an appropriate tax liability. 
The conclusions reached herein suggest that § 108 is overbroad, and perhaps considerably so. 
However, the relief provided by that section is equally available to recourse and nonrecourse 
borrowers and thus does not constitute a reason for discriminating against basis allocations 
attributable to nonrecourse indebtedness. 
103. This timing flows automatically from the assumptions of a tax based on net worth and the 
initial decision to exclude the proceeds of a loan from income. Under the current rules, the original 
borrowing does not produce a taxable increase in net worth, and income is not generated until the 
liability is eliminated through the cancellation of the loan. 
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foresight allowed for an immediate tax at the time the loan was obtained, 
the amount subject to tax would be only equal to the present value of the 
obligation to repay the principal at the time of forgiveness. 
For example, the present value of an obligation to repay a $100 loan 
after ten years, discounted at an after-tax interest rate of eight percent, is 
approximately $45, and the present value of the after-tax interest burden 
is $55. If it could be foreseen that the taxpayer would not repay the 
principal amount but would make each interest payment as it became 
due, the $100 receipt would remain offset by the $55 obligation to pay 
interest but would not be offset by the $45 obligation to repay the princi-
pal. Accordingly, the taxpayer would have obtained a $45 accretion to 
wealth and should be taxed on that amount. 104 
If the present value of the amount ultimately forgiven were taxable 
upon receipt of the proceeds but the tax was deferred until cancellation 
of the liability, it would be proper to charge interest on the deferred tax 
liability from the time the proceeds were obtained to the time the tax was 
imposed. Continuing the preceding example, suppose the rate of tax was 
forty percent. The taxpayer's liability then would be forty percent of 
$45, or $18, were the tax imposed at the time of loan. If the tax were 
imposed ten years later, interest should be charged. At an after-tax rate 
of eight percent, the total interest charge would be $22, making the total 
tax liability $40. 
That $40, however, is precisely the amount of tax collected under 
Kirby Lumber and the cancellation-of-indebtedness doctrine. Taxing the 
full amount forgiven in the year of cancellation, then, is equivalent to 
taxing the present value of the amount cancelled in the year the loan is 
obtained and charging interest for the period of time in which that tax 
liability remains unpaid. The result is not surprising. At the assumed 
rate of interest, a tax on $45 today is the equivalent of a tax on $100 ten 
years from now. 
The foregoing demonstrates that the remedy imposed under Kirby 
Lumber for failing to repay a loan is adequate. Thus, there is no techni-
cal reason for penalizing a nonrecourse borrower by restricting his ability 
to obtain the normal tax consequences for the expenditure of loan pro-
ceeds. The at-risk concept, therefore, lacks a technical justification, as 
long as the taxpayer is taxed upon the cancelled amount. 
104. Alternatively, the cancellation of the debt can be viewed as taking place at the time the last 
interest payment is made. In order to compare the nominal amount of the debt cancelled with the 
equivalent amount at the time of the borrowing, the nominal amount must be discounted back to the 
time of the borrowing. In the example above, the nominal amount cancelled is one hundred dollars, 
which is equivalent to $45 when discounted back to the time of the borrowing. Thus $45 is the 
amount that should have been taxed at the time of the borrowing, had all future events been known. 
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b. The Special Case of Forgiven Interest 
Taxing the principal forgiven, however, will not produce a sufficient 
tax liability in cases where the taxpayer did not pay interest on the 
amount purportedly borrowed. In such cases, again assuming perfect 
foresight, the borrower should be taxed on the full face value of the loan 
at the time of receipt since that amount is not offset by any future interest 
liability. And, as before, an interest charge on the tax owed must be 
imposed if the tax is not collected until the debt is formally forgiven. 
However, merely taxing the loan principal when the debt is subsequently 
cancelled will not result in a tax liability that completely compensates for 
the absence of actual interest payments. 
The cancellation of the interest obligation also produces a cancella-
tion that is properly subject to tax. 105 Since the taxpayer received value 
in the form of the use of the borrowed proceeds, the failure to make 
interest payments represents a taxable accretion to wealth. Taxation of 
that income, however, should be treated differently from the forgiveness 
of loan principal. Analytically, the forgiveness of any debt represents 
first a transfer of value from the lender to the borrower and then an 
immediate retransfer of that value to the lender. The first constructive 
transfer produces income for the borrower. However, in this case, the 
second constructive transfer also produces a deduction, since the con-
structive payment is for interest106 and interest payments are deducti-
ble. 107 This deduction therefore offsets the income received upon the 
constructive transfer, and no tax liability should result. 
When a lender forgives the payment of interest, the borrower bene-
fits from the cancellation in precisely the same manner as if the lender 
had forgiven repayment of a portion of the principal. Consequently, the 
cancellation should be considered as taxable income to the borrower. 
However, the borrower is in the same position as if he derived a cash 
105. United States v. Little War Creek Coal Co., 104 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1939); cf. Rev. Rul. 76· 
316, 1976-2 C.B. 22 (corporation's forgiveness of interest owed by solvent subsidiary results in 
income to subsidiary when interest payments had been deducted in previous years under accrual 
accounting system). 
106. The Commissioner and Congress have often overlooked this aspect of the cancellation of 
deductible liabilities. See Coven, Liabilities in Excess of Basis: Focht, Section 357(c)(3) and tire 
Assignment of Income, 58 OR. L. REv. 61,63-66 (1979) (analyzing consequences of incorporating a 
business and having corporation assume all liabilities under § 357). Congress, however, has 
provided partial solutions. For example, the discharge of an indebtedness does not produce income 
to the extent that the payment of the liability would have been deductible. I.R.C. § 108(e)(2) (1982); 
see also id. § 357(c)(3) (1982) (assumption of deductible liability not taxed). 
This same result should follow when a taxpayer assumes a debt upon the transfer of property. 
However, the consequences of assuming deductible liabilities are not governed by statute and arc 
often overlooked in litigation. See, e.g., Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12, 18 n.14 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (court observed that taxpayer failed to raise the issue). 
107. I.R.C. § 163 (1982 & Supp. 1984). 
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receipt from the lender and had used that cash to pay interest on the 
loan; his actual net worth has not changed. Had the taxpayer actually 
paid the interest, he would have been entitled to a deduction; thus, he 
should not be left in a different position merely because the payment of 
interest was constructive. The forgiveness of interest produces construc-
tive income and should produce an offsetting constructive deduction. 
Under the normal operation of the Kirby Lumber-Crane system, the 
constructive interest deduction offsets the income from the cancellation 
of the obligation to pay interest, and a tax is imposed only upon the 
cancellation of the principal amount of the indebtedness. As shown 
above, that amount of tax is inadequate. As a result, the Kirby Lumber-
Crane system does not produce the correct tax liability in such 
circumstances. 
A correct tax liability can be created consistently with Kirby 
Lumber in either of two ways. One method would impose an actual 
interest charge on the deferral of the tax liability on the principal to the 
extent the lender forgives the interest. When the borrower does not pay 
interest or repay principal, thereby creating a deferred tax liability, the 
Code could impose an interest charge on the tax produced by the cancel-
lation for the period during which interest was forgiven. 
To illustrate, assume that a taxpayer with a marginal tax rate of 
forty percent borrows $100 for ten years at an after-tax interest rate of 
eight percent. The lender, at the end of six years, forgives all subsequent 
interest payments as they become due and ultimately forgives the princi-
pal at the end of the tenth year. A proper tax liability would have been 
obtained by imposing a $40 tax at the end of the sixth year had the loan 
been forgiven at that time. Suppose, however, that the tax was deferred 
until the principal was formally forgiven in the tenth year. The proper 
result would be to impose a tax of $40 at the end of the tenth year and 
charge interest on that amount for the four years the interest was 
forgiven. 
The same result could also be achieved by disallowing the deduction 
for the constructive interest payment with respect to the forgiven princi-
pal. Thus, a proper correction would occur if the amount of the forgiven 
interest were treated as taxable income. The interest on the unpaid prin-
cipal would be rendered nondeductible, not because it is theoretically 
inappropriate to permit a deduction for the constructive interest pay-
ment, but simply because denying the deduction provides a convenient 
substitute for imposing an interest charge on the deferred tax liability. 
This alternative solution has the slight advantage of administrative ease, 
but it is theoretically incorrect. Imposing an actual interest charge 
would thus be preferable. 
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C. Kirby Lumber and Partnership Debt 
Applying the same concepts can ensure the proper taxation of the 
cancellation of partnership debts. Kirby Lumber provides an adequate 
correction if the partnership is taxed at the time the debt is cancelled and 
the interest has either been paid by the partnership or has been forgiven 
and taxed as suggested above. If the basis attributable to the partnership 
loan has been allocated in accordance with the profit-sharing ratio, the 
corrective tax liability automatically will fall in the same proportions. 
The partner who has been treated as a borrower and granted a basis 
adjustment will also be taxed on the corresponding portion of the cancel-
lation-of-indebtedness income. 108 
To ensure the adequacy of the correction, however, the partners 
must also bear the interest costs involved in the deferral of tax liability. 
This interest burden must be allocated in the same manner as the basis 
increase attributable to the borrowing, in order to prevent some partners 
from benefitting from the cancellation of the debt. 
Current law does not require that interest be allocated in this man-
ner. The partners may allocate any expense, including interest on a part-
nership borrowing, in any proportion they desire, provided the economic 
burden and tax benefits of the expense are allocated in the same propor-
tions.109 Interest on a partnership borrowing, however, differs from 
other partnership expenses because it represents the cost of a borrowing 
that has increased the partners' bases for their partnership interests and 
has thus permitted the deduction of current losses. Permitting one part-
ner to deduct an interest expense attributable to another cannot be justi-
fied. In this respect, at least, the allocation rules are unduly flexible and 
should be amended to require that interest on a partnership loan be allo-
cated to the partners in the same proportion as the basis increase those 
partners receive by virtue of the borrowing. If the suggestions recom-
mended in this Article are adopted, the interest expense will be allocated 
in accordance with the profit-sharing ratio. Each partner will thus bear 
the burdens associated with the repayment or cancellation of a debt in 
the same proportion that each benefitted from obtaining the loan. 
D. The Application to Limited Partners 
A limited partner may benefit from the economic equivalent of debt 
cancellation even though the partnership fully repays the loan. The 
repayment of any partnership loan is treated as though the partnership 
distributed cash to the partners and the partners used the cash to dis-
108. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
109. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (1985). 
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charge the liability.110 As long as the value of a partner's interest in part-
nership assets, including unrealized appreciation, exceeds his share of 
partnership liabilities, this treatment adequately reconstructs the transac-
tion in accordance with the aggregate approach to partnership basis. 111 
However, if the partner's share of the cancelled liability exceeds the value 
of his interest in the partnership (and he is not obligated to make any 
further contribution to the partnership), the partner cannot properly be 
viewed as having discharged his entire share of the liability. His obliga-
tion to repay the debt is limited to his interest in partnership assets, and 
those assets are insufficient. To the extent of the insufficiency, other part-
ners have in fact discharged the liability. 
Assume, for example, that limited partnership GL had previously 
incurred a nonrecourse debt to finance the acquisition of depreciable 
property. Through disproportionate allocations of depreciation, limited 
partner L's basis has been reduced to zero and his capital account shows 
a deficit. Partner G, however, has a positive capital account. The prop-
erty has appreciated in value and in fact is worth more than the sum of 
the remaining debt and G's capital account. On these facts, L's partner-
ship interest has value, and if the partnership were liquidated, L would 
receive a distribution. Thus, if the nonrecourse debt is paid off by the 
partnership, it is entirely reasonable to view the transaction as if the part-
nership had distributed cash to L and L had discharged his own share of 
the loan. 
Alternatively, the value of the property might exceed the amount of 
the loan but that excess might not equal the size of G's capital account. 
In that event, the partnership would be solvent but L's interest would 
have no value; on a liquidation of the partnership, only G would be enti-
tled to a distribution after the loan had been repaid. While the repay-
ment of the loan would not result in cancellation-of-indebtedness income 
to the partnership, it is not realistic to view L as repaying his share of the 
loan. The value of his interest in the partnership is not sufficient to sup-
port a distribution of the required amount to him. Rather, G has dis-
charged a portion of L's liability out of assets that G would otherwise 
have received upon the partnership's liquidation. 
110. I.R.C. §§ 731, 752 (1982). 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 21-29. If the constructive distribution exceeds a 
partner's basis for his partnership interest, the partner will be taxed as if he had sold a portion of his 
partnership interest. If the distribution does not exceed the value of the partner's interest, he has 
realized a portion of the appreciation inherent in his share of partnership properties and should be 
taxed as if he had sold those properties. 
If the partnership has elected the optional basis adjustment provided by §§ 734 & 754, the 
partnership can increase the basis for partnership properties to the extent that the distributee partner 
has been taxed. Thus, the transaction is treated as if the distributee partner sold his interest in 
partnership properties to the other partners. See I.R.C. § 734 (1982 & Supp. II 1984); id. § 754 
(1982). 
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In substance, G has advanced amounts to limited partner L to per-
mit repayment of the indebtedness. Whether that advance will ripen into 
cancellation-of-indebtedness income depends on whether the partnership 
credits future profits to L as a source for reimbursing G. If not, a cancel-
lation of debt will occur, and the limited partner should be taxed 
accordingly. 112 
If, prior to the loan's repayment, the limited partner had borne his 
share of the interest cost, 113 taxing him on his share of the cancelled 
liability will produce an appropriate corrective tax result. The tax on 
that amount is the economic equivalent of a tax at the time of the loan on 
the present value of the liabilities not repaid, plus interest. The resulting 
tax is also equivalent to denying the limited partner an initial basis 
increase attributable to the borrowing in an amount equal to the present 
value of the amount of the borrowing that he will not repay. 114 More-
over, since this procedure affects only those limited partnerships in which 
a true cancellation of debt occurs, and then only to that extent, it is better 
tailored to economic realities than are the at-risk rules. 115 
Present law incorrectly taxes the shift in the economic burden of 
repaying partnership loans. All constructive distributions attributable to 
repayment of partnership indebtedness are treated as actual distributions. 
As a result, those distributions are not taxed unless they exceed a part-
ner's basis for his partnership interest.U6 If a partner recognizes gain, 
112. If thereafter L is allocated part of the partnership profits, he will be taxed on that amount 
but will not obtain any economic benefit from that allocated income until his capital account 
increases to zero. If the partnership earns enough money, L will eventually reimburse G, albeit 
without the payment of interest on the temporary "loan." 
113. Those expenses would be borne through charges to the partner's capital accounts. 
114. Taxing the forgiven interest is the same as disallowing a deduction for a constructive 
payment of the same amount. See supra text accompanying notes 89·90. 
115. Because the limited partner may ultimately repay his share of partnership liabilities 
discharged by other partners, it would not be unreasonable to defer the taxation of that cancellation 
of indebtedness. However, there are overwhelming practical reasons for imposing an immediate tax 
upon the cancellation of a limited partner's liability. Whether a partner benefits, either permanently 
or temporarily, from a discharge of indebtedness depends on whether his share of the liability repaid 
by the partnership exceeds the value of his partnership interest. Calculation of the tax therefore 
requires the valuation of the partner's interest in the partnership. It is difficult enough to value a 
partnership interest contemporaneously. If the tax consequences are deferred, the proper 
computation of tax liability will require an impossibly burdensome retroactive valuation of the 
partnership interest. The burdens and imprecisions of retroactively valuing these interests would 
make it virtually impossible to defer the tax consequences of such a transaction. 
Furthermore, taxing a borrower on the cancellation of debt produces an appropriate tax liability 
oaly if the borrower has been paying interest. While the discharge on behalf of a limited partner 
whose partnership interest has become worthless resembles an advance from the "creditor" partners, 
that advance is not a loan in the traditional sense and certainly does not bear interest. Accordingly, 
the deferred taxation of the cancelled debt will never produce an adequate remedy. For these 
reasons it seems preferable to require the valuation of limited partnership interests at the time the 
indebtedness is repaid. 
116. I.R.C. § 731(a)(1982). 
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however, the distribution is taxed as the sale of a partnership interest and 
warrants capital gains treatment. 117 
Under the current system, the value of the partner's interest in the 
partnership.is not material. Thus, the entire amount of the constructive 
distribution is treated as a gain on the taxpayer's investment in the part-
nership, notwithstanding that the amount of the distribution exceeds the 
value of the partnership ~terest and in substance represents a discharge 
of the distributee partner's liabilities. That discharge, of course, should 
not be eligible for the favorable capital gains rate of tax. 118 Subchapter K 
should therefore be revised to tax constructive distributions caused by 
the repayment of liabilities as cancellation of debts, but only if the dis-
tributee partner is not obligated to make further contributions to the 
partnership, and only to the extent the distribution exceeds the gross 
value of the partner's interest in partnership assets.119 
E. The Impact of Tufts 
The current system will not impose the proper tax liability unless 
the tax rate applicable to the cancellation of debt corresponds to the tax 
rate that would have applied at the time of the borrowing. As discussed 
earlier, if the government could determine that a loan will not be repaid, 
then it should tax the purported borrower at ordinary income rates. 120 
The receipt wonld represent a windfall gain not related to the disposition 
of a capital asset, and t)lere would be no justification for imposing the far 
117. These consequences of a distribution are subject to the provisions ofi.R.C. § 751 (1982 & 
Supp. II 1984). This section may classify a distribution as ordinary income, but such a result occurs 
because of the nature of the partnership assets, not the presence of cancellation-of-indebtedness 
income. 
118. The proper taxation of the discharge of a partner's liability cannot be achieved by merely 
recharacterizing as ordinary income the income produced by a distribution. Gain on a distribution 
is determined by reference to basis; discharge of the partner's liability is determined by reference to 
value. If the partnership assets contain unrealized depreciation in value, it is entirely possible that a 
constructive distribution will exceed the value, but not the basis, of the partner's interest. The excess 
of a constructive distribution over value should be taxable at ordinary income rates even though 
under present law the distribution would be treated as a nontaxable return of capital. It is not clear, 
however, that this refinement is essential to an initial revision of subchapter K. 
119. A limited partner who has been taxed because he apparently benefited from a discharge of 
indebtedness will be overtaxed if he uses profits later credited to him to "reimburse" the "creditor" 
partners. Those profits will tend to restore the limited partner's deficit capital account to zero but 
will not entitle him to an actual distribntion upon the liquidation of the partnership. Instead, the 
value represented by those profits will be distributed to the "creditor" partners. Crediting those 
profits to the limited partner, however, will increase the limited partner's outside basis, I.R.C. 
§ 705(a)(l)(A) (1982), and thus, will create a loss offsetting the previous tax on the apparent 
cancellation of his indebtedness. Under current law, the offsetting loss will be a capital loss obtained 
on his ultimate withdrawal from the partnership. To properly reverse the effects of the earlier 
imposition of tax, the loss should be an ordinary loss and should be available in the year that profits 
are credited to the limited partner. Again, it is not clear that the enhanced aceuracy this refinement 
produces justifies the resulting complexity. 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94. 
.. · ... 
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less burdensome capital gains rate of taxation. Accordingly, a proper 
correction will not be obtained unless the system taxes cancellation of 
debt at ordinary income rates. 
While no one has seriously suggested that a cancellation of indebted-
ness should be otherwise taxed, 121 in practice the tax consequences of a 
debt cancellation have been greatly confused by the decision in Commis-
sioner v. Tufts. 122 The facts in that case reflect a typical tax shelter. With 
no material equity invested, the taxpayer's partnership acquired a build-
ing with the proceeds of a $1,800,000 nonrecourse loan. Somewhat atyp-
ically, the actual depreciation of the building exceeded the tax 
depreciation, so when the partners sold their partnership interests, the 
building's adjusted basis exceeded its $1,400,000 fair market value by 
$50,000. The purchaser, who acquired the building subject to the 
$1,800,000 indebtedness, did not make a substantial cash payment to the 
selling partners. The taxpayers treated the amount realized on the sale as 
the fair market value of the building and thus claimed a $50,000 loss. 
Presumably relying upon the ambiguous state of the law, the sellers 
ignored the resulting $400,000 relief from indebtedness. The Commis-
sioner, perhaps afraid of confronting the ambiguous cases concerning the 
cancellation of nonrecourse indebtedness, argned that the taxpayers real-
ized the full $1,800,000 face amount of the liability of which the selling 
partners had been relieved. The Supreme Court concurred in the Com-
missioner's analysis and thus treated the taxpayers as if they had sold a 
building worth $1,400,000 for $1,800,000. As a result, the taxpayers 
were permitted to treat the $400,000 income from the disposition as capi-
tal gains rather than as cancellation-of-indebtedness income. 123 
The Tufts decision is economically unjustifiable, for it permits tax-
payers to convert ordinary income into capital gains. To the extent the 
proceeds of the sale qualify for the preferential capital gains rate, the cost 
of failing to repay a debt will be more than halved, and taxpayers will be 
able to secure a substantial after-tax advantage by incurring a debt they 
do not repay. Accordingly, before the proposals made here can be imple-
mented, the decision in Tufts must be overturned, either judicially or by 
congressional action. 124 
121. But see Chirelstein, Fruit-Tree and the Ordinary Income Base, 1 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 1 
(1980) (when cancellation of indebtedness occurs because of fluctuation in interest rates, income 
should be eligible for capital gains taxation). Of course, all cancellations of indebtedness do not 
occur for that reason. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) (sharp decline in 
property value caused by dislocation of local economy). 
122. 461 u.s. 300 (1983). 
123. ld. at 312. Indeed, the Court explicitly discussed the treatment of the cancellation as 
capital gains and not as ordinary income. ld. at 310-11 n.ll. 
124. Insofar as cancellation-of-indebtedness income is taxed at ordinary income rates by virtue 
of depreciation recapture, the Tufts approach would not in fact impair the proposal made here. See 
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A reversal of the decision in Tufts would be entirely appropriate, for 
that decision is unsound in principle. This Article is not the occasion for 
a detailed dissent from the Supreme Court's characterization of the gain 
realized in Tufts as attributable to the sale of property rather than the 
cancellation of a debt. However, the general outline of the objection to 
that decision can be simply stated. Intuitively, the decision appears erro-
neous because people do not sell property worth $1,400,000 for 
$1,800,000; nor do people pay $1,800,000 for property worth $1,400,000. 
The very suggestion that such a transaction occurred raises an inference 
that, in fact, something else occurred as well. 
When property is conveyed to a lender in complete satisfaction of a 
debt, two transactions occur simultaneously: the property is sold and the 
debt is exth1guished. In keeping with other Code applications, 125 neither 
transaction should be ignored, and each must be taxed in accordance 
with economic reality. Thus, to the extent that value is transferred to the 
lender, the debt is repaid; to the extent that the extinguished debt exceeds 
the value of the property transferred, the debt is cancelled. Further, the 
property has been sold and the amount realized on the sale must equal 
the amount of the debt that has been repaid by transferring the property, 
which is the value of the property. As a result, both transactions should 
produce precisely the same tax consequences as they would produce if 
they had occurred separately. 
The facts in Tufts, however, were more complex, for the property 
was not conveyed to the lender but rather to an unrelated third party. 
Nevertheless, the consequences to the seller should not be different. 
When property subject to an indebtedness is sold, the transaction is 
reconstructed for tax purposes as if the purchaser had refinanced the 
acquisition of the property, paid cash to the seller, and the seller had 
discharged his own liability. 126 That reconstruction ensures that the 
transaction is taxed in accordance with its underlying economic reality 
and in exactly the same manner as if it were a sale for cash. Thus, the 
amount of this constructive refinancing must equal the amount the seller 
originally agreed to pay for the property and would have paid in a cash 
purchase. 127 When the property is subject to a nonrecourse debt, how-
I.R.C. §§ 1245 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986), 1250 (1982 & Supp. II 1984); see also Estate of Delman v. 
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979). 
125. Somewhat inconsistently, when a property sale is financed by the seller and the loan bears 
an inadequate interest rate, the Code is rather rigorous in dividing the purported purchase price into 
its true principal and interest components. See I.R.C. § 1274 (West Supp. 1986); cf. id. § 467 (Supp. 
II 1984) (imputing an interest factor on deferred payments for services or of rent). 
126. Cf. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938) (assumption of taxpayer's debt in 
corporate merger treated as though taxpayer had been paid by entity assuming debt). 
127. It has been argued that the result in Tufts can be justified by analogizing the right to 
discharge the debt through a transfer of the property to a put. Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 
TAXES 949, 956 (1983). The put analogy, however, is a strained construction of a loan agreement 
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ever, that amount cannot exceed the value of the property. 128 Since the 
debt can be discharged by a transfer of the property, the value of the 
property is the maximum amount that the buyer has agreed to pay for 
the property. In reality, the fact that the face amount of a nonrecourse 
note exceeds the value of the encumbered property has become 
irrelevant. 
Accordingly, the buyer should acquire a basis in the property equal 
to its market value and the seller should be treated as receiving that same 
amount on the sale. That treatment of the seller is entirely correct 
because, under the terms of a nonrecourse loan agreement, the seller may 
discharge his obligation for that amount. Plainly, under the reconstruc-
tion of the transaction, the seller should not be treated as transferring 
any greater amount to the lender. To the contrary, as to the seller, the 
excess of the amount of the debt over the property value has been can-
celled and should be subject to tax at ordinary income rates. 129 
There are several reasons why the Supreme Court did not adopt the 
separate-transaction analysis in Tufts. 
Most prominent among them is the fact that the Commissioner did 
not argue for that result. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor 
suggested that the separate-transaction analysis was preferable to the one 
adopted by the Court but that the Commissioner had applied a single 
transaction analysis for too long for the Court to impose a different result 
on its own motion.130 Moreover, some statutory131 and judicial132 doc-
that limits the right of the lender to seek a deficiency judgement. Moreover, that analogy is of little 
assistance in resolving the consequences of a transfer to a third party as occurred in Tufts. 
128. In Tufts the Supreme Court acknowledged the Hendler reconstruction, Tufts, 461 U.S. at 
308-09, but overlooked its economic reality basis. Thus the Court erroneously treated the amount of 
the constructive refinancing as the face amount of the debt. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310. 
129. As to the buyer, the full amount of the loan remains outstanding and, if the property 
appreciates in value, must be paid. In that event, the buyer would be entitled to an increase in basis 
for the actual amount of any payments on this contingent obligation that exceeds the amount of the 
debt that was taken into account in the original basis computation. 
130. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
131. Cf. I.R.C. § 108 (1982 & Supp. II 1984) permits some taxpayers to defer the recognition of 
cancellation-of-indebtedness income by reducing the basis of depreciable property or otherwise 
foregoing tax benefits. · 
132. For no obvious reason the notion has persisted that the pre-Crane rule, which applied a 
single-transaction analysis to exempt the cancellation of a nonrecourse indebtedness from tax, 
survived the decision in Crane. In Tufts, the Supreme Court referred to that obsolete rule with 
acceptance, if not approval, 461 U.S. at 310-11 n.ll, thus breathing new life into that ill-conceived 
notion. The correct rule, enunciated in Kirby Lumber, has been recognized by the courts, Collins v. 
Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467 (1963), and apparently is the rule currently applied by the 
Commissioner. Rev. Rul. 82-202, 1982-2 C.B. 36 (noting that value of encumbered property 
exceeded face amount of nonrecourse debt). The contrary suggestion in Tufts should be disregarded. 
In Collins, however, the court did not entirely shed the remnants of the single-transaction 
analysis. The court viewed the taxpayer as having borrowed $300 on a nonrecourse basis and 
pledging stock as security for the loan. When the lender later cancelled the debt, the value of the 
stock had declined to $100. The Court held the cancellation taxable but limited the amount subject 
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trines might defer or even eliminate the tax on the cancellation of a debt 
while leaving the gain on a sale fully taxed. None of those reasons, how-
ever, undermine the theoretical propriety of the preceding analysis. The 
taxpayer in Tufts should not have been entitled to any such relief from 
current taxation. Nevertheless, the result-oriented underpinnings of the 
Tufts decision were an insufficient foundation for the Court's disposition. 
IV 
POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE AT-RISK CONCEPT 
The foregoing has demonstrated that the at-risk concept is an 
unnecessary technical component of the income tax system. The con-
cept, however, might be defensible on other grounds. This section briefly 
notes the policy considerations that may underlie the at-risk rules and 
argues that, while the objectives of curbing fraudulent valuations and tax 
shelters are valid, the at-risk rules do not adequately address such 
problems. 
Retaining some form of the at-risk rules for policy reasons, however, 
would not alter the conclusions reached in the previous sections. Since 
the at-risk concept is not necessary for the creation of appropriate tax 
burdens, it should not play a role in allocating basis attributable to part-
nership loans or in allocating losses among partners attributable to the 
expenditure of loan proceeds. 
A. Tax Shelters 
Section 465 represents a congressional compromise to restrict the 
excessive use of tax shelters. The House of Representatives had proposed 
that taxpayers be barred from deducting certain losses against income 
generated in unrelated activities. 133 The Senate, however, concluded that 
this limitation was too draconian and suggested that only losses attribu-
to tax to the $100 value of the stock. The tax-benefit concept applied by the court was, of course, 
erroneous. There was no reason to offset the loss on the stock against the gain from the cancellation 
of the indebtedness because the stock had not yet been sold and the loss thus remained unrealized. 
Aside from that infirmity, associating the loss on the stock with the gain from the cancellation of the 
debt is improper under the Crane separate-transaction analysis. 
The Tax Court recently committed a similar error in a case that apparently involved recourse 
indebtedness. In Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 147 (1984), the court 
permitted cancellation-of-indebtedness income to be offset by losses incurred on the expenditure of 
loan proceeds. As in Collins, the invocation of the tax-benefit rule was improper since those losses 
apparently had produced prior tax deductions. While these cases suggest that the tax-benefit rule 
may offset the taxation of cancellation-of-indebtedness income regardless of the character of the 
debt, they also support the proposition that cancellation of either recourse or nonrecourse 
indebtedness generates taxable cancellation-of-indebtedness income under Kirby Lumber. 
133. H.R 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § lOl(a) (1975). 
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table to nonrecourse financing be so limited. 134 The result was the at-risk 
rules of section 465. 
The section 465 rules did not emerge from theoretical reservations 
over the treatment of nonrecourse debts. Rather, they were designed to 
reduce certain accelerated deductions generated by tax shelter activi-
ties. 135 Section 465 focused on nonrecourse debt because tax-shelter lim-
ited partnerships needed to use nonrecourse financing to achieve their 
objectives, whereas traditional businesses claiming the same deductions 
tended to employ recourse financing arrangements. The at-risk rules, 
therefore, should be viewed as an expedient designed to curb taxpayer 
abuse of technically sound provisions. 
Except where taxpayers have been able to exploit the imperfections 
or exceptions contained in section 465, the at-risk provisions appear to 
have retarded the abuses at which they were aimed. 136 This gain, how-
ever, has not been achieved without heavy cost. The previous sections of 
this Article indicate the theoretical inconsistencies of the at-risk rules. 
The complexities of these provisions have led to uncertainty and litiga-
tion. Clearly, an equally effective, but less costly and complex, method of 
restricting tax shelters would be desirable. 137 
When the at-risk rules were adopted, it was generally assumed that a 
tax shelter could be readily recognized but not statutorily defined. The 
legislation of that period thus identified a series of symptoms of tax shel-
ter abuse and imposed restrictions whenever those symptoms appeared. 
Hence Congress enacted provisions covering farming syndicates, 138 net 
leases, 139 and nonrecourse debt. 140 
However, congressional ability to address the tax shelter problem 
generally seems to be improving. With a decade of experience in attack-
ing shelters, Congress and the Treasury Department have begun to draft 
rules specifically aimed at tax shelters and to undertake the required stat-
utory definitions. 141 To date, the definitions supplied have been both 
134. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 3483. 
135. /d. 
136. See Shine, Exotic Tox Shelters Compared With Real Estate, the King of Shelters, 37 N.Y.U. 
INsr. ON FED. TAX'N, 9-1 to 9-20 (1979). 
137. Furthermore, § 465 does not generally apply to the holding of real property, a major 
shelter activity. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (1982). 
138. /d. §§ 447, 464 (1982). 
139. /d. § 57(c) (1982). 
140. Id. § 465 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
141. The provisions are both procedural and substantive. E.g., id. § 6111 (Supp. II 1984) 
(requiring registration of tax shelters); id. § 461(i) (Supp. II 1984) (limiting deductions by cash 
method tax shelters); id. § 1274(b)(3)(B) (Supp. II 1984) (altering computation of principal amount 
of debt for purposes of computing original issue discount); id. § 666l(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1982) (statutory 
definition of tax shelter for limited purposes ifimposing penalties on entity substantially understating 
tax liability). 
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vague and excessively broad, 142 but they are at least as accurate as the 
proxies employed a decade ago. 
This statutory evolution provides a superior approach to the tax 
shelter problem. Nonrecourse debt is a highly unreliable indicator of tax 
shelter abuse. Not all tax shelters employ nonrecourse indebtedness; 
some do not employ debt at all. 143 On the other hand, nonrecourse debts 
finance certain purely commercial, non-tax shelter activities that should 
not suffer the punitive sanctions of section 465. With its increased 
sophistication, the Treasury Department is now better able to tailor its 
attack on tax shelters than it was ten years ago. Accordingly, it is no 
longer necessary for Congress to rely upon the second-best solution con-
tained in section 465.144 
B. Fraudulent Valuations 
Another argument in support of the at-risk concept may have 
greater merit. Even if the cancellation-of-indebtedness doctrine imposes 
an appropriate tax liability, it is nevertheless inappropriate to permit tax-
payers to claim fraudulently inflated tax allowances. Deductions based 
upon fictitious information are already unlawful145 and should remain 
impermissible. Furthermore, inflated deductions create the potential for 
manipulation of the Code's timing provisions that the proposed system 
may not entirely eliminate. 
Although an inflated basis can result when property is subject to 
recourse financing, taxpayers are far more likely to acquire property at a 
higher purchase price when their actual liability to pay is limited to the 
true value of the property acquired. Such fraud is difficult for the Com-
missioner to address on an individualized basis. The at-risk rules elimi-
nate the possibility of depreciating a fraudulent basis and thus can be 
defended as an anti-fraud provision. While the at-risk penalty may be 
142. See 31 C.P.R.§ 10.33 (1985) (governing practice of issuing tax shelter opinions). For this 
purpose, a tax shelter constitutes an investment in which either the deductions exceed income or the 
credits offset the tax on all income produced. The definition further offers a lengthy list of exclusions 
that would otherwise be covered by this extraordinarily broad definition, including municipal bonds 
and individual retirement accounts. The temporary regulations to the tax shelter registration offer a 
somewhat more realistic definition requirement. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-1T (1984) (defining tax 
shelter as investment in which one could reasonably infer that the investment will produce losses 
twice the amount of taxpayer's contribution during any of first five years of operation). 
143. See Martin, Tax Shelters: 1984 Style, 36 MAJoR TAX PLANNING, 6-32 to 6-40 (1984), for 
numerous examples. 
144. Congress has also enacted a series of supplemental or alternative taxes on both individuals 
and corporations. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 55 (Supp. II, 1984) (alternative tax on individuals); id. § 56 
(Supp. II, 1984) (add-on tax for corporations). In addition, § 291 reduces by twenty percent the 
amount of certain preferential deductions corporations may claim. For a criticism of this approach, 
see Coven, The Alternative Minimum Tax: Proving Again that Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right, 68 
CALIF. L. REv. 1093 (1980). 
145. I.R.C. §§ 6700-6701, 7201-7209 (Supp. II, 1984). 
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theoretically unsound and overbroad, the chance of fraud inherent in 
nonrecourse financing may be sufficiently serious to justify eliminating 
nonrecourse debt from a taxpayer's basis in potentially abusive 
situations. 
The at-risk rules, however, were not crafted with that objective in 
mind. If Congress retains any form of the provision because of its anti-
fraud potential, the niles will require substantial revision. Real estate, 
for example, is highly susceptible to fraudulent overvaluation, 146 yet sec-
tion 465 presently excludes real property from its scope. 147 Conversely, 
other transactions lacking the potential for fraudulent valuation should 
be excluded from the scope of the at-risk rules. 
CONCLUSION 
When those responsible for creating the tax system have doubted 
that the separate-transaction system produced an appropriate tax bur-
den, they have tended to revert to the single-transaction approach. 
Rather than adjust the tax consequences of the borrowing, they have 
altered the normal tax consequences of spending the loan proceeds. The 
Treasury did so in the section 752 regulations, Congress followed suit in 
section 465, and the Supreme Court did likewise in Tufts. In each 
instance, the introduction of an inconsistent analysis of debt-financed 
property transactions has produced confusion and complexity. 
This Article has demonstrated that the separate-transaction system, 
properly developed and supplemented, produces an entirely sound 
method of taxation. Evaluating the impact of Kirby Lumber discloses 
that restricting deductions under the at-risk rules is unnecessary and 
often excessively harsh, and that the extension of traditional rules can 
eliminate improper tax avoidance. In revising the section 752 regula-
tions, the Treasury Department should adopt the dictates of Crane and 
reject the contrary implications of the at-risk concept. Congress should 
also abandon the at-risk rules in favor of more precisely tailored sanc-
tions on tax shelters engaged in fraudulent overvaluations. Both steps 
would simplify and promote the rationality of the Code. 
146. See, e.g, Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). 
147. I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (1982). 
